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ABSTRACT

This document provides a descriptive analysis of the University of Pittsburgh's experience with campus expansion during a 2 1/2 year period from fall 1970 to spring 1973. Part one describes a background and overview of campus expansion, a description of selective Oakland demographic characteristics, a discussion of the first major conflict with the community, a review of the Columbia University experience, and a chronology of events. Part two analyzes the changes in the universities' conduct of its campus or community relations vis-a-vis campus expansion, presents a series of vignettes of salient events, and reviews the chronology of events of this phase. Part three contains a synthesis of three papers prepared by participants of the controversy, and analyzes interviews with participants. Part four presents a short sociological analysis of the expansion. Maps and appendices of membership of Oakland development and by-laws of Oakland Development Inc. are presented. (MJM)

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TRUTH, LOVE AND CAMPUS EXPANSION

The University of Pittsburgh Experience

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TRUTH, LOVE AND CAMPUS EXPANSION

The University of Pittsburgh Experience

By

Paul C. Shaw

June, 1973

This paper was prepared under the auspices of the University-Urban Interface Program; Principal Investigator, Albert C. Van Dusen, Secretary of the University; Director, Robert C. Brictson.

PREFACE

The title of this report, "Truth, Love and Campus Expansion," requires a note of explanation. The title was suggested to me by Roland Warren's provocative collection of essays, Truth, Love, and Social Change (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1971). In his Preface, Warren writes: "The truth referred to here is the conviction of each contesting group that it has the truth, that it is right, and that the other side is simply wrong, out of either malice or ignorance. And the love referred to here is the feeling, held more or less strongly by most individuals, that no matter what the substantive disagreement, people should relate to each other as brothers." This seems especially apropos the University of Pittsburgh expansion controversy.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The research and analysis reported herein could not have been completed were it not for the cooperation of many persons. I am especially appreciative of the cooperation of: Sandra Phillips and Kim Fellner of People's Oakland; Billie Bramhall, Department of City Planning; and Daniel H. McFadden and Louis A. Tronzo, University of Pittsburgh.

I acknowledge also the helpful comments and constructive criticism, at various stages of the research, of my colleagues at UUIP, in particular Martha Baum and Barbara Jameson. A special thanks to Paul F. Lazarsfeld for his generous suggestions and cogent advice over the past two years. Of course, I alone am responsible for any errors of fact or interpretation.

Comments of interested readers are invited. After August 1, 1973, correspondence should be addressed to:

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TRUTH, LOVE AND CAMPUS EXPANSION

The University of Pittsburgh Experience

In the past decade, many universities have come under the careful scrutiny of their several constituencies. It is now common for students, along with some faculty, to question and sometimes challenge university educational programs, purposes, and goals. This student (and faculty) evaluative process has often served to unsettle and, in general, aggravate university administrators, faculty, alumni, trustees, and parents.

Similar demands and evaluations have also often come from a number of external groups--groups usually outside the realm of traditionally considered constituencies. Thus, from within and without, the university is being barraged by a variety of unsettling demands and influences.[1]

In part, these demands are a consequence of changes in a national political ethos--an ethos that has honed expectations and, in general, politicized the public, especially those traditionally outside the nation's influence structure. In addition, "new" demands are being made of universities because of their rapid growth in the last twenty-five years. The growth in university enrollment and, accordingly, in their physical plant has come during a period in which the public has seen higher education as a necessary part of young people's preparation for life and also when the metropolitan areas were experiencing what often seemed like exponential increases in population. Thus as urban universities grew, they found themselves increasingly having to compete with other

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[1]Paul C. Shaw and Louis A. Tronzo, "Community Constraints on Academic Planning: Myths and Realities," a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of The Society for College and University Planning, Atlanta, Ga., August 7, 1972.

urban residents for space. Consequently, many "universities have been forced to consider their relations within their districts, their immediate neighbors, the municipal governments of which they are constituents, and the major forces of the metropolitan region from which they expect support".[2]

The purpose of this paper is to provide a descriptive analysis of the University of Pittsburgh's experiences with campus expansion during a two and one-half year period from the Fall of 1970 through the Spring of 1973. Although a case study of only one university's experiences, this is, nevertheless, an attempt at a systematic descriptive analysis aimed at showing the forces with which the University has had to contend, as well as a description of the University campus expansion planning-decision-making processes and, finally, an assessment of those policies with accompanying recommendations. Where feasible, appropriate comparative data are used to illustrate the universality of experiences; comparison, however, is limited because the literature is often incomplete and anecdotal.

Part I of this report begins with a background and overview of campus expansion at Pitt. Next is a short descriptive section of selective Oakland demographic characteristics. A discussion of the first major conflict with the community follows. The proposed Hillside dormitory construction served as the rallying issue for community opposition, which quickly expanded to include the Forbes Area project.

The third section of Part I is entitled "The Commonality of Issues", and uses the Columbia University experience to demonstrate the comparability of issues arising around campus expansion. Although Columbia borders Harlem, whereas Pitt is relatively removed from black inner-city neighborhoods, readers should not therefore assume the experiences of each are

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[2]Kermit C. Parsons and Georgia K. Davis, "The Urban University and Its Urban Environment," Minerva, Vol. IX (July, 1971), pp. 361-385.

unique. What is important in understanding the Pittsburgh and Columbia experiences is that there are common, and perhaps generic, elements to the community challenge to campus expansion.

As the controversy evolved, we were able to identify four mistaken assumptions or myths. Pitt's campus planning and its response to the community challenge were based, we believe, on the four myths. The adherence to these assumptions explains much of the failure of the University's response to and handling of the challenge to the expansion plans.

Part I ends with a review of the Agreement of July 28, 1971 and a Chronology of Selective Events.

PART I

Expansion at Pitt: Background and Overview[3]

The University of Pittsburgh is a non-sectarian co-educational institution. Along with Penn State and Temple, it makes up the larger portion of the public university sector of the Pennsylvania System of Higher Education. Since 1966, the bulk of the University's educational programs and additions to its physical plant have been state-funded; it is a de facto state university.

The University's main campus is located in Oakland, a viable working and middle class, multi-ethnic community about three miles east of the center city. Oakland has been referred to by some as the "second city".

Reference to Oakland as the second city is due to its role as the city's cultural center. Also located in Oakland, in addition to the University of Pittsburgh complex, are Carnegie-Mellon University, Carlow College, the Carnegie Library Complex, including a museum and music hall, the Pittsburgh Playhouse, and the Syria Mosque (a large auditorium facility).

The main campus covers 125 acres, and Pitt owns and operates 45 buildings within this area. This includes the University Health Center, a focal point for the health-related professions with five major hospitals which have teaching and research affiliations with the University. In addition, during recent years the University has leased upwards of 100,000 square feet of space to accommodate current office and classroom demands.

In the northwestern part of the state, the University has four regional campuses, small but daily growing manifestations of an urban university outside of its urban home.

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[3]This section draws upon material provided by Bernard J. Kobosky, Vice Chancellor for Public Affairs, University of Pittsburgh, and is presented here in slightly revised form from Shaw and Tronzo, op. cit., p. 2, ff.

In the 1971-72 academic year, the University had about 17,000 full-time students on its main campus, with an additional 11,000 part-time students. Of the 17,000 full-time students, some 5,000 were graduate students. The enrollment is expected to grow moderately for the rest of the decade. The student body on the main campus has increased each year by the addition of juniors transferring from regional campuses. The University's total student body numbered 31,709 (including regional campuses) with 92 per cent of the students located on the Oakland Campus. In addition, there are 2,500 faculty and 3,000 staff members on the Oakland Campus. These figures represent the culmination of a sharp rise in enrollment during the last decade, which was accelerated by the 1966 change in the University's status from private to state-relatedness; a change which, in turn, resulted in an obligation to increase enrollment. For example, in 1966 the University's Oakland Campus had a full-time enrollment of 6,500 undergraduates and post-baccalaureate students; in 1966, there were 10,000 students enrolled full-time on the Oakland Campus.

In 1959, when it became clear that a new civic stadium eventually would be built, the old Forbes Field site (home of the Pirates and the Steelers and located adjacent to the University) became an important and logical area for University expansion. It was subsequently purchased by the General State Authority for the University.

Although former Chancellor Litchfield and his staff had conceived elaborate plans for increasing the University's presence in Oakland and thus making this section of the city even more of an educational and cultural center, shortly after the start of the administration of the present Chancellor in 1967 new comprehensive plans for the campus were drafted and steps taken to implement the plans. It was felt, in part, the

University needed a new overall master plan which would establish more clearly-defined campus boundaries.

This plan, when it was developed, was publicized in the city and in the adjacent Oakland community. News releases were prepared, models and charts were shown to several community groups, and following a request at one community meeting, the boundaries were formally recorded in the minutes of the Board of Trustees in order to get this commitment on record and to help assure its continuity with future administrations of the University.

In the Forbes Field area, the University proposed a five-phase project, with the first phase embracing parts of the Forbes Field site, and subsequent phases to cover a two-block area contiguous to Forbes Field. Two structures were to be developed on the initial site--one a quadrangle building to house the University's School of Education and the departments of the Social Sciences, and the other a separate building for the University's School of Law. (See Map Plan 1)

These plans were discussed in detail with the then relevant community organizations, such as Model Cities, the Oakland Chamber of Commerce, and the City Planning Department. With the exception, perhaps, of Model Cities, the groups contacted by the University had traditional or established institutional bases. Apparently no attempt was made to hold more public sessions that would potentially involve non-institutional interests, that is, to communicate at the "grassroots" level. However, no objections were raised to the project at that time; and the University subsequently made formal application to the General State Authority for funding.

Initial funding for Forbes Phase I was provided in 1968. The cost of the project at that time was estimated to be about $30 million.

Construction was scheduled to begin in early 1970, with completion about two years later. In the Spring and Summer of 1969, the General State Authority began acquiring residential properties contiguous to Forbes Field.

But in 1970, the implementation of these plans suffered the first of what turned out to be a two-year series of delays. Forbes Field did not become available to the University until mid-year because of delays in completion of the new Three Rivers Stadium. In conjunction with the Black Construction Coalition's effort to obtain more minority employment in the building trades, the University participated in a moratorium on all new building projects. There also were administrative changes within some of the key groups with which the University had been discussing its plans. These groups included the Oakland Model Cities organization and a new city administration which had come into office under a politically-independent mayor. In addition, in late 1970 and early 1971, several ad hoc community groups which had not existed at the time of the initial planning arose to express their concern over certain aspects of the plan.

As a result, the construction of two additional projects, physically unrelated (a hillside dormitory and the Learning Research and Development Center) were postponed. Plans for the dormitory have subsequently been cancelled, but may remain a viable option. The demolition of Forbes Field was completed during the Summer of 1972. In addition, the involvement of these ad hoc groups resulted in the July, 1971 abandonment of the master plan at a cost of about $5 million in, e.g., architects' redesign costs, escalated materials cost, etc. A few months ago, construction started on

the Law Building and the Social Sciences-Education Quadrangle. (See Map Plan 2, Area B)[4]

The Demography of Oakland: A Selective Profile

Oakland has a very visible student-University character to it. This results from a number of factors including the looming presence of the Cathedral of Learning, the Tower dormitories, and other University buildings. In addition, the Oakland business district is disproportionately student-oriented with a large number of bars, hamburger restaurants, record shops, and the like. Then, there are the students, of whom more than one-third live in Oakland in either University-operated dorms or apartments and in off-campus housing. Many of the off-campus students are housed in older homes which have been made into apartments. It is generally acknowledged that housing in Oakland is in a state of decay, and the 1970 Census indicates that about 75 per cent of all Oakland dwelling units were constructed in 1939 or earlier. Age is not necessarily indicative of decay, but perhaps a rough indicator.

Oakland is also an area of ethnic and racial diversity. The 1970 Census shows that 30 per cent of all Oakland residents are either foreign-born or of foreign or mixed parentage; the corresponding figure for the whole city is 25 per cent. Three of the eight census tracts making up Oakland are noticeably black: one tract is 78 per cent black, another is 24 per cent, and a third is 30 per cent. In the city as a whole, the black population constitutes only 20 per cent of the population.

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[4]Note: The shaded areas on Maps 1 and 2 are not drawn to scale and were not officially prepared or sanctioned by the University. However, the shaded area of Map 1 does closely approximate the design configuration of the Master Plan. Area B of Map 2 also approximates the planned construction as revised subsequent to the Agreement of July 28, 1971.

Oakland residents frequently express concern about crime, and rightly so. The Pittsburgh Bureau of Police Statistical Report, 1971 shows that of major crimes reported, Oakland ranks low in murder and manslaughter among the nine police districts, but third in the number of rapes reported, fourth in robberies, second in all larcenies, and is tied for second in auto theft.

The Hillside Dorms: First Clash

Although University expansion to the north had resulted in generalized rumblings of dissatisfaction from residents in that area in the recent past, the critical event which solidified residents and other interested individuals into formalized opposition to University expansion was the University's plan for appropriating parts of the Falk School (a University laboratory school) playground for use in constructing a hillside dorm. Just before the opening of classes in September, 1970, the Director of Falk School was informed by the University of the impending modification of the School's playground; his concern subsequently led to the involvement of the School's PTA as well as residents of the adjoining neighborhood (especially those on Allequippa and Brackenridge Streets) who would potentially be directly affected by dorm construction. A series of public meetings called by concerned residents began in September and out of this came the organization of People's Oakland two months later--a coalition of concerned community members and neighborhood groups. Then in January, 1971 at the Planning Commission's hearing on the University's conditional use application, People's Oakland filed, through their attorney, an eleven-page objection. The frequently expressed reasons for community dissent include: lack of consultation by University (this is perhaps the foremost reason); loss of open space and a "blocking view" caused by dorm construction; potential

increases in traffic and parking congestion; general mistrust of the University; fear of implied further expansion; inappropriate dorm scale; and some even questioned whether dormitories were outmoded in concept.

The lines were now drawn; for the first time University plans were seriously challenged. And the University, as one administrator put it, "was stunned . . . and somewhat outraged" because, in the University's view, "its good intentions toward the community in choosing this (the hillside) site were not recognized". He went on to say, "as a result, the University was not as prepared as it might have been to the original dissidents". Certainly, the University did appear stunned and unresponsive even though there was considerable evidence to suggest the University could no longer unilaterally design and implement policies that have a direct community impact. For example, neighborhood residents had openly expressed their discontent over plans for the construction of the Chemistry Building and plans for appropriation of the Dean Stone residence for University use. Nevertheless, the University was unprepared to deal with the opposition it now faced. The University, for the next eight months, proceeded without effective organization and planning, thus compiling a record of what now is seen as comic opera episodes which made the University appear intransigent and uncooperative and may have assisted the organizational efforts of the adversaries to campus expansion.[5]

The Commonality of Issues

What probably contributed to the University's faltering response to the community challenge is its administration's apparent inability to

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[5]This conclusion is based on interviews with several University administrators, observations of University-community interaction at the tripartite meetings, and from a perusal of Board of Trustee Minutes.

learm from the experiences of other universities, in particular, the Columbia experience which we believe is especially applicable to the Pittsburgh controversy. There is a commonality of issues involved in citizen opposition to university expansion; at least both Columbia and Pitt share the experience of having to deal with the same five issues.[6]

Issue: Is Campus Expansion Necessary? -- Pitt simply did not respond effectively to this issue when confronted with it. The University, for the most part, used traditional communication's techniques, e.g., press releases, along with an occasional "briefing" of selective organizations such as Model Cities and the local Chamber of Commerce. These methods, obviously, were not effective or appropriate; had they been, the controversy would have been averted or an institutional-community dialogue established earlier. It is ironic that, with its store of expertise, a university did not understand the social forces at work that would require a different communications process. But during the first year of our research, the University continued to view the community in a traditional manner. That is, the University was hesitant to deal with ad hoc citizens' groups and tended to resort to repeated pronouncements that expansion was now necessary in order to catch up with the growth in student enrollment during the 1960's. In addition, the University frequently reaffirmed its intent not to expand into the South Oakland residential area, that is, establish Oakland Avenue as the western boundary. What resulted were a number of incidents that suggested a

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[6] Crisis at Columbia, New York: Random House, 1968. There may, of course, be other issues and some of these may be unique to the experience of each university. However, the five issues discussed here were critical to both controversies. We caution the reader not to be misled by the differences in the populations surrounding Pitt and Columbia. What is important to an understanding of the comparability of the two experiences is that the issues raised by the community adversaries were identical, and

discrepancy between University words and deeds, and thereby diminished the credibility of University statements. Also, the University's credibility was tarnished by an ineffective internal communication and coordination system that frequently left the University open to charges of subterfuge.

Two examples: In a public meeting, University representatives said that the University did not own the Oakwood Apartments; and less than 24 hours later, another part of the University was notifying Oakwood Apartment residents of its acquisition by Pitt. On another occasion, television reporters arrived for a requested interview on Pitt's expansion plans to find the Chancellor attempting to remove the last section of Pitt's five-phase expansion model. In addition, the television reporter and his camera crew were kept waiting while representatives of several University offices argued about who should be the University spokesman before the cameras. The uncertainty was compounded by a continuation of the argument in the presence of the reporter, and the presentation that resulted was off-the cuff.

Issue: Did the University Make Long-Range Plans and/or Were the Plans Revealed to the Public? -- Issues one and two are very much interrelated. By 1970, Pitt had a well-developed master plan complete with an architect's scale model--the result of five to six years physical plant planning. Yet during the period when most of the expansion was planned, no office was concerned with the community relations aspect of expansion. The Department of Physical Plant may not have considered it necessary or even part of its responsibility to send out complete information about its plans. That is, the University did not publicly announce

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furthermore, in both controversies students and faculty played prominent roles in mobilizing community opposition.

its intention regarding plans before those plans were completed. It has been the University's policy to inform the community of its plans after the plans were finalized. This reflected, in part, political naivete on the part of Pitt because the current political climate seemes to require some degree of citizen participation in institutional planning. The critical distinction is between the full disclosure of completed plans and participation in the planning process. Community participation in institutional planning has been and remains the major point of contention between the community and the University. Related, however, is the broader issue of joint responsibility for development of the community, including repair of some of the deleterious effects of University expansion. Of course, at the time the expansion master plan was being prepared, the political climate may not have necessitated the full dissemination of plans. There were, however, both local and national indicators that unilateral planning would no longer be acceptable. For example, locally citizen discontent over University construction was beginning to be expressed, and nationally city and highway planners were abandoning the urban renewal approach and adopting a planning posture that included and encouraged citizen input.

During this period (1970-71), an effective University response, one that would place the initiative with Pitt, was not forthcoming because the University was not only divided over what its response should be, but, in addition, there was an uncertainty about which University office should be involved in dealing with the exercised community groups. As a result, there occurred a number of incidents in which the University issued contradictory statements; and at other times University representatives, largely because of inadequate role definition, were hesitant in assuming

responsibility when the situation demanded spontaneous decisions. Our observations suggest further that at times, administrative staff were not confident that they had received an adequate delegation of authority and therefore expedient decisions were not forthcoming. Thus, the University was vulnerable to community criticisms and was placed on the defensive; the community frequently had the advantage, perhaps even more than they realized.

Issue: Is the University Sensitive to Problems of Resident Relocation? -- Columbia University was perceived by its surrounding community as indifferent to the problems of resident relocation, and tenants in the expansion area reported that they were given no assistance in relocation. As it turned out, relocation is a moot question at Pitt because the University in the Summer of 1971, agreed to modify their expansion plan so as not to dislocate, with a few exceptions, residents of a two-block area across from Forbes Field.

However, had University construction proceeded as planned, the University would have been vulnerable to the same criticisms that Columbia received. During the intial months of the controversy, Pitt anticipated the eventual implementation of the master plan and continued to purchase property in the Forbes Field area through the General State Authority. Yet Pitt had no plan for a relocation center, to assist dislocated families, as was required by law. During the initial phase of the controversy, Pitt had only offered to pay relocation or moving costs of approximately $900 per family. A staff member of the Office of Governmental Relations did, however, propose a draft plan for the establishment of a relocation center, but this was not acted upon by University administrators. This is another example of the failure of the University to organize effectively during this phase of the controversy. Of course, it may have been that the University did not consider as serious the opposition by an apparently

ad hoc, fluid membership community group and were skeptical of making an agreement with a group that seemed unrepresentative of the Oakland community. The University apparently feared that any agreement with a self-appointed group would last only until another body of citizens rose in opposition to a University program or policy. This seemed to be the position of some administrators, particularly those with experience in physical planning and University finance. In the past, this would have been a resolvable response. Social values have now changed and thus a failure or hesitancy to respond to self-appointed groups is a much less tenable position that it once was.

Issue: Has the University Planned for Multi-Use Buildings? -- Columbia was criticized for failing to plan for multi-purpose buildings--buildings designed for joint community-university use. The community has made the same charge against Pitt; and in their alternative design to the Forbes Field master plan, they presented a multi-use structure. This alternative design included a mixture of academic facilities, commercial shops, and housing for non-student Oakland residents. The issue of removal or transference of community property to University use was and remains a viable issue. Community members continue to seek the return of property to community use and joint or mixed usage of other properties, especially that of the so-called two-blocks area.[7] The two-blocks area was acquired under the master plan but since its modification does not remain an immediate location for new construction.

At this writing, progress is being made toward finding mutually satisfying uses for the two-blocks area. Many of the difficulties in agreeing upon space usage are due to legal complications. For example, there is a

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[7] See Map Plan 2, Area A.

deed restriction[8] prohibiting the reintroduction of commercial space for 25 years, and General State Authority funds are restricted to academic uses.

Issue: Has the University Made an Effort to Reconcile Differences With the Community? -- Columbia University was charged with failing to make a serious effort to cooperate with community leaders in reconciling differences. Comparable charges have been leveled against Pitt by a number of non-institutional community groups. Again, this reflects the change in the political climate of the last few years, but it is something that Pitt has had to contend with and consider in formulating its "community policy".

During the first phase of the controversy, the University was clearly divided over the question of recognition of ad hoc or "consumer" type community groups as valid representatives of the Oakland community. However, the University's community relations specialists[9] and the Director of City Planning agreed that self-declared community representatives should be accepted as valid community representatives. Moreover, some of these same University specialists as well as a University consultant expressed their belief that institutions, for example, Pitt, must increasingly incorporate regard for the community consequences of their actions, and hence, must accept the possibility of having to compromise on their programs and goals.[10]

It was clear during this period that Oakland did not speak with a single voice, and it was evident also that spokesmen for community groups

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[8] The University's agreement to the deed restriction has been a point of controversy. For example, some contend that because of the state's power of eminent domain the deed restriction was unnecessary, and agreed to for political reasons (one of the signatories has recently been appointed by the Governor to a judgeship).

[9] We refer to Dr. Lloyd Bell, Office of Urban and Community Services, and Louis A. Tronzo, Office of Governmental Relations.

[10] Conversation with Dr. Wayne Holtzman, President, Hogg Foundation, and Professor of Psychology, University of Texas.

did not have a firmly-conceived plan for an alternative role for the University. People's Oakland, the organizing force behind opposition to Pitt expansion, is composed primarily of middle-class intellectual types--college students, professors, architects, physicians--and a sprinkling of neighborhood residents (including a variable number of older ethnic residents). It was reported, however, that People's Oakland collected a petition containing the names of several hundred Oakland residents who supported their efforts to stop or modify University expansion plans.

As a result of the organization of People's Oakland and their subsequent efforts to thwart the University's implementation of its expansion program, the University was forced to engage in an extended series of negotiations with the city and the community. A direct result of these negotiations was a series of moratoriums on campus expansion which eventually led to the University's abandonment of its master plan at a cost of approximately $5 million (this includes escalated construction costs, architects' fees, etc.).

However, the University--or at least parts of it--recognized the potential political and economic consequences of the problem. For example, Louis Tronzo, Assistant Director, Office of Governmental Relations, in his proposal for a University-Community Corporation or consortium,[11] attempted to direct the University toward the establishment of a developed community policy. Yet, the University continued its indecisive course.

Perhaps never before had the University been faced with such organized and sophisticated opposition to its development plans. As a result, the

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[11]Louis A. Tronzo, "A Proposal to Meet the University-Community Challenge," Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh, July 1, 1970. Also see: Lloyd Bell, "Memorandum to Vice Chancellor Montgomery," December 23, 1970, which endorses formation of a consortium similar to that proposed earlier.

University was continually on the defensive. For example, People's Oakland pushed for the establishment of a charrette as a mechanism for resolving the expansion controversy, thus requiring the University to react to a community "move".

Charrette Planning is a recent technique for resolving institutional-community conflicts. City planners, with encouragement from HEW, have successfully used the charrette mechanism in resolving citizen disputes over public use of neighborhood school facilities. Typically, a charrette means the establishment of an extended and continuous planning session between citizen and institutional representatives, each with an "equal vote" or with citizens having a weighted vote. Public officials, usually city planners, serve as mediators.

We would suggest that although charrette planning may be successful in resolving disputes between neighborhood schools and residents of the neighborhood, an urban university is not an institution comparable to a neighborhood school. For example, an elementary or secondary school is designed to serve a local, well-defined constituency, whereas a state-related urban university must be responsive to a less well-defined constituency that is more heterogeneous and geographically scattered. An institution of higher education such as Pitt is <u>in</u> Oakland, but not necessarily <u>of</u> Oakland. The non-University public residing in or operating businesses in adjacent areas are <u>only</u> one of that University's publics. However, a charrette may be an appropriate mechanism for resolving a single planning issue such as the two-blocks dispute.

In any event, a charrette was never established or, it seems, seriously considered by the parties involved. It seemed to be suggested more as another means of pressuring the University to capitulate to community

demands. However, those community members (e.g., People's Oakland) who suggested the charrette, undoubtedly believed it to be a useful technique for resolving a complex and difficult situation.

Politically, to suggest a charrette could prove to be a shrewd tactic for a community group to employ because it could put the community in the position of appearing cooperative while forcing the institution to accept or reject a technique that appeared neutral but in reality often seems weighted toward the community. And this is a continuing quandry in which the University was and is put, for the University has felt the community to be a negative force with nothing to lose and everything to gain by challenging the University; whereas the University might be required to modify or scrap existing plans at the loss of considerable time and money. Of course, many residents feel they have much to lose from University expansion also.

Thus, in early 1971, with the encouragement[12] of the Department of City Planning, a reluctant University entered a "dialogue" with its community adversaries and City Planning. The so-called tripartite meetings were conducted by City Planning in a "neutral mediator" role, with the University and community fulfilling adversary roles. As a result, until late 1971, there was little constructive dialogue. The University, especially in the early months of 1971, did not seem to take seriously the intent of the meetings. Our observations and interviews suggest that the University treated the meetings as an incumberance that must be suffered in order to accomplish the implementation of the master plan.

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[12]It has been reported that the Mayor insisted that Pitt satisfy the community before its approval would be given to University projects.

Again, it should be understood that the University, at least the senior administrators, had not anticipated the community challenge and, in addition, were unaccustomed to dealing with non-elitist, ad hoc community groups; nor were they familiar with the party independent character of Mayor Peter Flaherty and the advocacy planning approach of the City Planning Department. In the past, the University's expansion had not been opposed by local politicians and usually had the active support of the Mayor. Local politics, however, were rapidly changing. Peter Flaherty, in the Spring of 1969, entered the Democratic primary, upsetting the machine's candidate and thereby breaking a 33-year hold on local politics by the Lawrence-Barr organization. In the Fall, Flaherty easily defeated the Republican Party's nominee and thus began the "New Politics" reign of Peter Flaherty, who at this date seems a remarkably independent and non-organization politician.[13] So the University was faced with a new set of political values nationally and locally.

Adding to the University's difficulty in coping with a changing political culture and new political leadership was its persistence in maintaining a traditional organizational response with its pragmatic "nuts and bolts" perspective in the face of ad hoc community opposition. From the University's viewpoint, the community groups were unrepresentative and tended to present issues within a philosophical and ideological framework--hardly a context conducive to constructive dialogue. This tendency of the University to deal with issues in a "dollars and cents" short-run context and the community to use a longer time frame with a more macro-social perspective has continued to be somewhat of an incumberance in

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[13]Frank Hawkins, "City Hall Has 'New Politics'," Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, January 22, 1973.

resolving the issues and constituted a particular handicap during the early months of the tripartite discussions.

In sum, much and perhaps most of the University's difficulty in coping with the community's challenge to campus expansion rests with the University's adherence to a traditional planning - administrative perspective. That is, the University was unable and/or unwilling to change its historical mode of operation--at least the part that was concerned with community relations. In part, this is because several of the assumptions that guided the internal policy process were no longer viable.

Myths and Realities

We have been able to identify at least four myths that the Pittsburgh experience has shown to conflict with reality.[14] For example, one mythology has been that universities in launching campus expansion plans need only to respond to students, faculty, trustees, and traditional sources of funding--that is, the university, for its maintenance and viability, need only placate and build bridges to these groups. The reality, as shown by the Pittsburgh experience and the experience of other universities, is that universities must take into account the total range of public, private, and political interests which may singularly or cooperatively work against an institution's plans for expansion. While the university mission is broad, the constraints which influence its local interests are parochial.

At Pitt, the failure to recognize this and act accordingly has caused a severe financial loss, and lengthy delays in construction of facilities. These losses are directly attributable to the rise and subsequent coalition of several ad hoc community groups.

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[14] This section draws upon the "Myths and Realities" section of Shaw and Tronzo, op. cit., pp. 6-8.

A second myth is that the local institution is unique--in other words, the experience of each urban university is unrelated to the others. In reality, the patterns of opposition to the expansion of university physical plant seem increasingly common. The commonality of the issues involved in citizen opposition to university expansion is suggested by the Cox Commission Report[15] and discussed above. Thus, there were similar experiences which were applicable.

A third myth has to do with changes in the national political culture and its applicability to the local scene, and this is, in part, what makes the experiences of other universities comparable. What we are suggesting is that there is a new political ethos which says that those outside institutional power bases must have a voice in institutional decision-making. It is a demand for, in fact, an expectation, that participatory democracy will apply to all. It is these new conditions which university administrators have been reluctant to acknowledge, instead they have attempted to conduct business as usual. Moreover, the implications of state relatedness will require more attention to the non-university publics.

A fourth myth suggests that those who object most strenuously to expansion are those most directly affected, that is, those who are to be displaced. At Pitt, the most determined opposition came from persons whose interests were geographically on the periphery of the expansion area. We should emphasize also that in Pittsburgh the ad hoc community groups who objected to University expansion were assisted in their formation and subsequent maintenance by a city planning department that has adopted a

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[15] Crisis at Columbia, New York: Random House, 1968. Interested readers should see also: Kenneth Daly, Institutions of Higher Education and Urban Problems: A Bibliography and Review for Planners, Monticello, Ill.: Council of Planning Librarians, 1973.

citizen advocacy planning posture, and by the presence of a mayor who is perecived as anti-establishment. In addition, there occurred a critical event which seems to have served to legitimate opposition to University expansion. This event was the University's plan to build a high-rise dormitory adjoining a University-owned and operated elementary school, which would cause an alteration of the school's playground and, in general, increase the vehicular traffic in the school area. It is important to understand that this type of event can rally those who are potentially the most effective in organizing opposition to university plans--namely, the middle and professional classes. In contrast, the "Group for the Preservation of Pitt Planning" consists of an alliance of property owners whose properties were originally to be acquired by the University and who were eager for the Pitt expansion plan to proceed as formulated. Finally, it should be noted that those who benefit the most from expansion--faculty and students--cannot be counted upon to rally to the university's defense. At Pitt and Columbia, although much of the opposition leadership was comprised of students and faculty, the majority of both these constituencies were silent and uninvolved. The absence of expressions of faculty and student support is not unexpected because these two groups are rarely invited to meaningfully participate in university planning.

The July 28 Agreement

On the afternoon of July 28, 1971, representatives of Pitt, People's Oakland, South Oakland Citizens Council, and the City of Pittsburgh reached an agreement which was publicly presented at a tripartite meeting that evening. Vice Chancellor for Finance, Edison Montgomery, made the presentation before the group, and his announcement included the following points: (1) Governor Shapp has indicated his interest in a mutually-

satisfying resolution of the Forbes Field dispute and "he fully supports the concept of community involvement in future University physical planning"; (2) the City Planning Department will "support greater flexibility in zoning requirements to accommodate mutually satisfactory design solutions", but "will oppose any expansion of the University (tax-exempt properties) outside its present boundaries", and, further, the City Planning Director indicated that he does not believe the rehabilitation of Forbes Field is economically feasible (note: Forbes Field's rehabilitation was being strongly pushed by People's Oakland); (3) the University agreed to suspend indefinitely the acquisition of property in the Forbes Field area, as well as in the vicinity of the Nursing School where an addition to the parking building was planned; (4) "the University will no longer seek to undertake development in the Forbes Field area in accordance with its existing plans"; (5) joint planning should "commence immediately with the University, the city, the community, and the state for the use" of the Forbes Field area and adjacent properties owned or used by the University; (6) "in the joint planning effort, provision will be made for the development of new commercial space and 'people-oriented' space somewhere in the above-described area as well as space for University needs"; (7) redesigned plans "must yield as much square footage for University use as was provided in the original plans for Forbes Phases I, II, and III"; and (8) "while planning can be done jointly, University fiscal resources will be employed only for that portion of development which is related to academic needs".[16]

This agreement of July 28 becomes an important document and date because of its wide implications for University-community relations. Although the University had been engaged in a dialogue with the community

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[16]University Press Release, July 28, 1971.

and indirectly with the city, under the auspices of the tripartite meetings, these usually had taken the form of negotiations between adversaries, whereas the July 28 agreement commits the parties to a joint planning process. Further, the interest of the state in the outcome of the controversy is now clear (the Governor officially supports joint planning) and its involvement above board. The July 28 document is important also because the city has once again expressed its determination to limit the expansion of tax-exempt properties. In December of 1970, Mayor Flaherty, in a public statement, had expressed his commitment to limiting the expansion of tax-exempt land as well as the desirability of the city receiving in lieu payments for services rendered to tax-exempt property; however, this statement had gone virtually unnoticed by University administrators. The part of the agreement that resulted in the most debate is the section that unequivocally states that Pitt will no longer seek Forbes area development "in accordance with existing plans"--that is, the University throws away the Forbes area master plan and starts anew. It is not clear how thoroughly this part of the agreement had been discussed or considered within the University prior to its public presentation on the 28th of July, but the University subsequently sought to modify this section by pushing for consideration of the Forbes master plan as one alternative design. The Chancellor seemed particularly relectant to completely discard the original Forbes Field design.

A final section--and a topic still being discussed and negotiated--has to do with the incorporation of community and/or commercial space in the "two-blocks" area of the Forbes Field plan. Thus, the University agreed to allocate space for community activities and development but not to use University funds for non-academic development nor to reduce the University's square footage as contained in the original plan.

With the July 28 agreement, Phase I of the expansion controversy is closed and the agenda for Phase II is partially determined.

Chronology of Selective Events Leading Up To The July 28 Agreement

January, 1963

-- University planners meet at Chancellor Litchfield's farm to "brainstorm the new Oakland". The result was a vision of Oakland as a socially and economically variegated community but one populated by greater numbers of professionals (mostly University people) and related activities and services.

-- Oakland Chamber of Commerce recommends Forbes Field be returned to the community, with provision for use for Pitt athletic events, and the razing of Pitt Stadium for University expansion.

July, 1965

-- Pitt expansion plans cause formation of Schenley Farms Protective Association and Citizens Opposed to the Dangers of Redevelopment in Oakland.

February, 1966

-- Pitt announces planned additions to Scaife Hall and the Natural Science Building, and the construction of a 12-story Engineering Building.

November, 1966

-- Acting Chancellor Kurtzman announces planned second campus on hillside above Pitt Stadium, including Lutheran Cemetary, for construction of dorms and off-street parking.

October, 1968

-- Chancellor Posvar speaks before Pittsburgh Rotary Club about the University master plan. He speaks of a 10-15 year construction program with $60 million to be spent in the Forbes Field area and $40 million for the health complex. Posvar did not foresee "any large scale opposition" to expansion; however, the Oakland Chamber of Commerce did express opposition to the closing of streets as would be required by Pitt's master plan.

-- The response to Pitt's announced plans included the suggestion for public hearings so that citizens and district planners can comment.

September, 1970

-- "Canter's Restaurant" meeting, jointly sponsored by SOCC, Oakland Chamber of Commerce, Model Cities, and Pitt. The agenda included discussion of Forbes Field demolition, University real estate acquisition in Oakland, proposed University relocation activities, and cross-town expressway.

December, 1970

-- Mayor Peter Flaherty, in a budget message to City Council, announces his interest in a "moratorium on the growth and expansion of tax-exempt institutions".

January, 1971

-- People's Oakland issues The Wrecking Ball, #1. University expansion is compared with an octopus's tentacles reaching into Oakland. A call is made for expressions of community opposition to Pitt expansion.

March, 1971

-- (Tripartite Meeting: City, Community, University) At this, the first tripartite meeting, the Director of City Planning announced that both he and the Mayor agreed that a "triumverate dialogue would be a desirable approach to resolving existing conflicts"-- conflicts "which now exist because of the projected impact of proposed University of Pittsburgh expansion on the surrounding community and the city itself". In order to begin the meetings in good faith, the City Planning Director suggested that Pitt withdraw or delay its conditional use application on the hillside dorm for a period of 60 days.

April, 1971

-- People's Oakland presents their Forbes Plan before a tripartite meeting.

May, 1971

-- People's Oakland presents their Forbes Field plan to a meeting at the Paul Younger Center.

-- People's Oakland Forbes Field plan presented to the University architect for review and comment.

June, 1971

-- Pitt's University Senate rejects People's Oakland plan for Forbes Field.

July, 1971

-- Director of City Planning, in a letter to the Vice Chancellor of Finance, reaffirms the city's position on expansion of tax-exempt land and expresses support for the community's contention

that Pitt has not demonstrated that expansion beyond existing boundaries is necessary. The Director also warns the community that they cannot expect to have as great a voice in planning Pitt construction for areas within existing boundaries. Further, the city does not believe it practical to rehabilitate Forbes Field and therefore has no objection to its demolition.

-- Pitt publicly rejects People's Oakland's proposal for rehabilitation and conversion of Forbes Field for joint University-community use.

-- Second edition of People's Oakland's Wrecking Ball. A call for public attendance at the July 14 tripartite meeting to express opposition to University expansion plans.

-- July 28 Agreement calls for abandonment of Forbes master plan and commits Pitt to joint planning process re future expansion.

PART II

Introduction

Part II begins with an analysis of changes in the University's conduct of its campus or community relations vis-a-vis campus expansion following the July 28 agreement. As we point out, the University gradually moves from its defensive or reactive response to the community challenge, primarily as a result of the emergence of the Office of Public Affairs in the leadership role.

Next follows a series of vignettes of salient events in the second phase of the expansion controversy. Part II ends with a Chronology of Events.

Phase II (August, 1971 to Present)

Following the July 28 agreement and the University reorganization, the character of the University's conduct of its community relations as related to expansion began to change and as a consequence, the character of the negotiations between the University and community also changed.

For approximately four months following the July 28 agreement, a series of meetings was held between Pitt and the community under the mediation of a General State Authority (GSA) representative--usually the Deputy Director. The GSA was very much interested in a resolution of the controversy because the state had approved the original design, appropriated the money for its construction, and now not only was that design not to be built but construction costs were rapidly escalating. The meetings mediated over by GSA were usually of the "task force" or "working session" type, with a few representatives of each group rather than the large public sessions of the past.

From the viewpoint of the community representatives, the role of GSA was to limit the range of issues for discussion to the siting of the Law and Social Sciences-Education Buildings. Thus, questions about uses for the two-blocks area, Schenley Plaza, and the first floor of the Quadrangle building were not dealt with although community negotiators felt they were important to a mutually agreeable settlement. In November of 1971, an agreement was reached on the siting of the Law School and Education-Social Sciences Building.

It is not clear what affect the University reorganization and the Chancellor's memo about the need for a coordinated long-range plan had on the negotiations with the community during the Fall of 1971; however, by early 1972 the effects were discernable.

For the first time, the University was no longer on the defensive hurrying to react to the challenge from the community. Also the character of the tripartite or joint-planning meetings was changing. During the first year (1970-71), the meetings were conducted between adversaries and were, consequently, often heated and angry. Now the sessions took on the character of negotiations with both sides seemingly more willing to bargain sincerely.

There are a number of possible reasons as to why the process was changing. For one, the community had met with considerable success in their challenge. Because of community opposition, formalized communications were established between community and University; the University had drastically changed its plans for Forbes area expansion, the community helped determine the siting of the Law and Education-Social Sciences complex (at an escalated cost of $5 million), construction of the hillside dorm (a $13 million structure) was cancelled, and a joint-planning process

was in its formative stages. Thus, the community had several dramatic successes and therefore could approach future meetings with feelings of some optimism and confidence and with the knowledge that their organization was now established with some permanence and could function effectively.

Secondly, the organizational changes within the University coupled with the hard realities of having made significant compromises on expansion plans resulted in a sharp alteration in the University's handling of its expansion planning and attendant community relations. On the one hand, some University administrators now understood that they must deal with the community and primarily because of city pressure must do so within the context of joint-planning. Although the University was certainly not of one mind about how the community challenge should best be handled, it should by this time have been apparent to all that the University must take the community seriously--delay would not result in the dissolution of community opposition and thus time was not on the side of the University. On the other hand, the emergence of Pitt from its reactive and defensive maneuverings into a position whereby the University could deal with its adversaries with some effectiveness is a direct result of the Chancellor's decision to assign the leadership role in campus expansion-community relations to the Office of Public Affairs. Although it is difficult to point to particular or discrete events to illustrate the results of this administrative change, it is clear to one who has observed for more than two years the conduct of expansion planning-community relations that community relations are best handled by that administrative office whose experience is in dealing with people (especially a diversity of individuals and interests) rather than by experts in matters of finance and physical plant. This may seem a "common sense" conclusion, but it is one that should,

nevertheless, be emphasized because as best we can determine the conduct of community relations in connection with campus expansion is and has been at most universities conducted by experts in finance, budgeting, and architecture and we suggest this is, in large part, why expansion plans often go awry. We do not, however, mean to suggest that community relations-campus planning be treated as a public relations problem, because that, too, we suspect, is exactly how personnel in university offices of finance, architecture, etc. treat or respond to community opposition.[17] This certainly seems to have been the Pittsburgh experience. Once the University's community relations specialists (notice that we did not use the more constricted term public relations) were assigned the dominant role, the situation began to change--change for the better for the University, and we believe for all parties concerned. It is important to understand also that public affairs experts not only know better how to deal effectively with other individuals and groups, but at Pitt the change in the character of the process is a result of the style of University decision- or policy-making that emerged concurrently with administrative reorganization. There occured not only better coordination (where before there had been none), but more effort at having the University speak with a single voice; and most important of all, the University (really the reorganized Office of Public Affairs) for the first time began to use its staff for brainstorming sessions or pre-planning/pre-policy sessions in which strategies, tactics, priorities, alternatives, and contingencies were considered.

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[17]By public relations we mean the distribution of press releases, media oriented messages, and in general, a "hard sell", rather than building constructive community relations through the opening of communication (which is reciprocal) and in positive acts that demonstrate concern and good will.

Thus, we believe, the University began to effectively respond to the community only with the emergence of Public Affairs in the leadership role and with the concomitant shift to systematic priority and contingency planning. In short, the University began to plan and to use their expertise to anticipate the community's mood and demands before responding.

The City Planning Department's efforts at establishing a University-community dialogue suggests confirmation of what the planners knew all along: that the process of communication is probably more important to the resolution of differences than is the substance of the dispute. At this point in time, it looks as if the establishment of communications between the interested groups is an essential prerequisite to the successful resolution of the dispute as well as a necessary condition to preventing the recurrence and escalation of future disagreements. We would strongly suggest that one of the major lessons to be learned from the last two and one-half years is that had communications with the non-institutional community been established earlier, the present dispute may have been rendered less severe.

Further, the University seems to be learning that most decisions and policies can be arrived at openly. Not only is it difficult for the University to conduct its business in secret--because the University is such a diffuse and decentralized institution--but secret decisions are usually not necessary and attempts at keeping plans and planning secret usually serve to produce anxiety and misunderstanding.

The following are a series of high-points or vignettes of salient events and happenings in the second phase of the expansion controversy. These include: administrative reorganization at the University, WQED meeting, payments for municipal services, and the Oakland transportation study.

Administrative Organization

In the Summer of 1971, a number of changes were made in the University's administrative structure. In addition to changes on the Chancellor's staff, the appointment of a new Provost and the return of Student Affairs from Vice Chancellor status to that of Dean[18] (with concurrent appointment of a new Dean), there occurred several other changes all of which bear upon the conduct of campus expansion planning and community relations. Until late in the Summer of 1971 (after the July 28 agreement), the Vice Chancellor for Finance, with the assistance of the Director of Physical Plant, was in charge of the conduct of community relations as it pertains to campus expansion. In August, the Vice Chancellor for Finance resigned to accept the position of Associate Vice Chancellor, Health Professions, and the Office of the Vice Chancellor for Finance was functionally divided between two newly-appointed Vice Chancellors--Operations, and Planning and Budget. In addition, the Vice Chancellor for Program Development and Public Affairs was appointed University Secretary with rank of Vice Chancellor, and PDPA restructured with the former Vice Chancellor for Student Affairs appointed to Vice Chancellor for Public Affairs. Subsequently, the Chancellor assigned the Office of the Vice Chancellor for Public Affairs the primary responsibility for communications development with regard to campus expansion. The assignment of the "leadership role" to Public Affairs not only removed Finance and Physical Plant from negotiations with the community, but was in recognition of the need for the University to speak with a single voice to the community and to develop a long-range and coordinated community policy.

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[18] Recently the position has again been elevated to Vice Chancellor status.

January 1972 WQED Meeting

At a meeting between representatives of the University, city and community held at WQED, People's Oakland presented their proposal for the formation of a joint-planning and development organization. In this draft proposal it was suggested that an Oakland Development, Inc., as an umbrella organization with representatives of all Oakland interests (community, city, institutional) be formed. It was proposed that ODI take the form of a non-profit corporation in order to maintain what was seen by People's Oakland as a "fragile balance" or mix of institutions, students, and long-term residents. Although fifteen months later ODI had not been incorporated, or even had its by-laws formally adopted by its membership, it immediately became operable. Its ultimate effectiveness is, of course, yet to be seen, but it has the formal sanction of the Oakland community (May, 1972) and is the major reason for the regularization of institutional-citizen relations. And through regularized contact, mutual confidence and recognition of mutual interests are developing--that is, the basis exists for making a concerted attack on the larger range of problems facing Oakland. See Appendix A for a current list of ODI members, and Appendix B for the latest draft of ODI by-laws (at this writing, June, 1973, by-law acceptance appears imminent).

Payments for Municipal Services

In June of 1972, after six months of negotiations, the University and the city reached an agreement in which Pitt agreed to pay the city $60,000 a year for various city services. The agreement was carefully worded to indicate that Pitt was not making a payment in lieu of taxes, which might be illegal since Pitt is a state-related institution. The $60,000 figure is for the first year only; the amount the University will pay will be adjusted yearly in proportion to changes in the city's operating budget.

Once again, Pitt was caught by a nation-wide trend without having a developed contingency plan for responding to local pressure for in lieu or other payments. But even though the University did not anticipate the issue arising locally, the outcome does not seem particularly disadvantageous to the University. Pitt agreed to pay $60,000 "in exchange" for removing property from the tax rolls that was generating about $83,000 a year in local taxes.[19] Although the $60,000 figure may be increased in subsequent years, it is less than, e.g., Harvard, M.I.T., Michigan, Penn State, West Virginia, Iowa, Wayne State, and Delaware, pay to their local municipalities. For example, Penn State contributes approximately $200,000 yearly to their borough fire department; West Virginia University pays about $145,000 yearly for fire protection; and the University of Michigan pays Ann Arbor about $350,000 yearly.

These examples represent an increasing nation-wide tendency for colleges and universities to pay taxes, make in lieu payments, or provide direct services (e.g., fire, police, etc.) to their local municipalities. In a 1969 American Council on Education survey, one-third of all colleges and universities had made at least one of the above three arrangements with their communities. A more recent Pitt survey of sixteen universities found 50 per cent with contractual agreements with cities. In the past, it has been more common for private colleges and universities in smaller cities (under 100,000 population) to make contractual arrangements; recently, there is an increased tendency for public institutions and those in larger cities (over 500,000 population) to feel pressure to pay taxes or make in lieu payments.[20]

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[19] The Pittsburgh Press, June 7, 1972.

[20] John Caffrey, "A.C.E. Special Report: Tax and Tax-Related Arrangements between Colleges and Universities and Local Governments," Highlights, August 12, 1969.

In Pitt's case, its dispute with the community over campus expansion put the city in a particularly advantageous position for extracting an agreement with the University. Without a sympathetic city administration, University construction could be difficult to complete. For example, the city: controls the issuance of building and conditional use permits, controls zoning, can prohibit (or delay) the temporary closing of streets as required by the construction process, and can be overzealous in the enforcement of building codes. Thus, there are any number of ways in which the city can delay and frustrate the construction of University facilities. It has, therefore, a psychological, if not real, advantage over the University. In addition, the city was in a position to informally encourage the University's community adversaries who were politically sophisticated anyway and who also controlled the Neighborhood Planning Team of Model Cities as well as serving on its Board, and thus was in a position of influencing, if not determining, Model Cities approval of federal funding of Pitt construction since Pitt was within the "Model neighborhood".

It should be noted, however, that the $60,000 payment by Pitt to the city did not reduce the Mayor's interest in extracting additional payments from Pitt. The University has requested the closing of Pennant Place (a short one-block street running between Forbes and Sennott Streets and separating Hillman Library from the Common Facilities Building) because once the Law and Social Sciences Buildings are completed, the University would like to turn Pennant Place into a mall-park area; if not closed; the increased concentration of students would make vehicular traffic difficult and dangerous to pedestrians. The Mayor has given his tentative approval to the closing of Pennant Place, but is requesting that the city be reimbursed $98,774 in exchange for vacating the street. The $98,000 is

probably a bargaining point rather than a seriously hoped for payment because early in the negotiations over in lieu payments, the city had asked for $400,000 from Pitt, and then settled for about $60,000 per year. And more recently, the city has requested payment by the University for the University's appropriation of Girts Way, a short, dead-end alleyway running into the area now excavated for the Law School foundation.

Oakland Transportation Study

In November of 1972, the University signed contracts with Alan M. Voorhees and Associates, transportation and planning consultants, to conduct a $15,000 University-funded traffic or transportation study of Oakland for ODI. At several ODI meetings when discussing the potential impact of the planned Forbes Quadrangle construction on traffic and transportation patterns, it was evident that there was no recent or comprehensive data available on which to base speculations about impact. Reliable data seemed especially needed because University construction might increase the concentration of cars in Oakland and, more importantly, some were suggesting that in connection with the Quadrangle construction, Sennott Street, which now separates the Law School plot from the Social Sciences Building site, should be relocated to the south of the new construction.

The study, to be completed within three to four months, is directed at producing "a set of recommendations by ODI which will lead to short-term actions and, perhaps, provide longer term guidelines for Oakland development". Further, the study objectives are "(1) to define explicitly the transportation problems . . . (2) to better understand the community impact of alternative solutions . . . (3) to begin an implementation process which will achieve adequate access to, from, and within Oakland . . ."[21]

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[21] Work Program, Oakland Transportation Study, November, 1972.

Chronology of Selective Events
Phase II

August, 1971

-- Tripartite meetings now include, and are chaired by, the Deputy Director of the General State Authority. GSA is concerned with the slowness at which decisions are reached in the tripartite process, the delay in University construction, and escalated costs caused by delays.

-- Oakland Chamber of Commerce holds meeting to obtain clarification of the University's expansion plans. The Chamber was concerned about rumors that Pitt will include commercial space in its new buildings and the Chamber was opposed to possible construction of multi-use structures.

September, 1971

-- Memo to Senior Administrators from Chancellor Posvar advising that the University needs to develop "a clearly articulated program to guide our official relationships with the various neighborhoods and communities that are adjacent to the campus". The memo states also that community misunderstanding of University intentions "has been compounded by the fact that no one individual or office has been designated to staff, coordinate, develop a policy, and direct negotiations with the various neighborhood groups or the public officials that are involved". The memo points, further, to the need to avoid crisis management, to develop a long-range program, and to speak with a single voice. To accomplish these ends, the Office of the Vice Chancellor for Public Affairs is assigned "the leadership role" in communications development.

November, 1971

-- People's Oakland submits their proposed program for the joint use of the Forbes Quadrangle ground floor. They suggest the allocation of approximately 2,220 square feet to be used for a number of "centers", including legal services, pre-school, teenage, and urban studies/community design. In an addition, more general suggestions were made concerning access and egress routes, landscaping, public space, and building facades. The proposal outlined also rather specific activities and activity space for each of the centers.

-- Chancellor Posvar announces University acceptance of "Plan D" for siting of buildings in the Forbes Field area and urges GSA to accept this design as agreed upon in discussions between Pitt, the city, the community, and GSA representatives. Pitt's Board of Trustees has also accepted the site plan.

-- GSA Board subsequently approves Plan D.

December, 1971

-- Formation of the Comprehensive Oakland Planning Group, a precursor to Oakland Development, Inc. and an evolved form of the "tripartite meetings".

January, 1972

-- WQED meeting--People's Oakland formally proposes formation of Oakland Development, Incorporated.

February, 1972

-- Chancellor Posvar's David Lawrence Hall address to the Oakland community. The purpose of the meeting was to report to the community the present status of Pitt's physical development and how the tripartite/joint sessions have affected both the University's plans and thinking about the community. Dr. Posvar reviewed the current history of Pitt expansion, explaining the construction now planned would be for catching up with previously established needs and that with a leveling off of enrollment and a tightening of money, construction beyond that now planned is problematical.

March, 1972

-- Increasingly clear that the Forbes project cannot proceed without resolution of tax issue.

-- City Planning continues to support concept of joint University-community facility as well as re-establishment of some commercial use in "two-blocks" area.

-- City Planning pushes for joint planning--believes process just as important as product.

April, 1972

-- April 5 Harrisburg Meeting. This meeting was called by the Director of the General State Authority to discuss problems and issues relating to the disposition of the property (two-blocks area) acquired for the University by the GSA originally for Forbes Phase I.

Members of the GSA Board in attendance included the Majority Leaders of both the State Senate and State House of Representatives

and the Minority Leader of the Senate. The University of Pittsburgh was represented by the Chancellor and five staff members. The Oakland Chamber of Commerce was represented by its President and Executive Director, and the community sent eleven representatives including an architect and an attorney.

The minutes of the meeting prepared by the University specify that three major decisions were reached: the property under discussion "is definitely University property for University use, which the University will orient as much as it can to community service; that there will be a joint-planning process to develop a comprehensive program for a new community-oriented University facility, hopefully to be funded by the GSA; and that this planning process will be a serious one extending over a year or more". The Deputy Director of GSA, in his minutes, concludes that there was a problem of determining long-term from short-term usage of the property, but joint planning will nevertheless apply to both, and there will be a joint inspection of the buildings in the two-blocks area to determine the advisability of rehabilitation.

However, the decisions reached at this meeting were cause for dispute between the University and ODI community members. The community members were angered when they learned of a February letter by Chancellor Posvar to the GSA requesting 30,000 square feet in the two-blocks area be reserved to University use and the remainder used for parking in the short-run; in the long-run, the Chancellor suggested the land be used for University buildings. A heated exchange of letters between the University and People's Oakland followed. Following this, an ODI committee was established and it subsequently developed 16 priority uses for the two-blocks area.

PART III

Introduction

This section of the report contains a synthesis of three papers prepared for UUIP by participants in the expansion controversy. One paper was prepared by a founder of People's Oakland; another by a city employee who was active in the tripartite discussions and assisted in the regularization of the community-University dialogue; and the third paper was prepared by a University staff member.

Part III concludes with an analysis of interviews conducted by UUIP with representatives to ODI. Both the interviews and the papers suggest potential areas of accord and thus a means to resolving the controversy.

Perspectives on Campus Expansion: Three Views

During the Summer of 1972, three observers of the campus expansion controversy agreed to our suggestion that they prepare individual papers offering their perspectives on the controversy. Each of the three--one community member, one city representative, and one University employee--have experience as "first-hand" participants in the dispute. The community member is a founder of People's Oakland, the city representative has been an active participant in the tripartite meetings and continues to be involved, but to a lesser extent, in ODI. The University staff member, although not involved as a negotiator at the tripartite or joint-planning sessions, has nevertheless served as a University spokesman and has frequently been involved in a staff support capacity. Thus, each has significant experience with and involvement in the campus expansion dispute.

Their papers offer their personal or individual interpretations. Each was provided by the researcher with a suggested but flexible outline to maximize comparability; it was understood, however, that each could deviate from the format to the extent necessary to present their own interpretation and analysis of the issue.

The resultant papers generally conform to the topic format, but included also additional perspectives or insights. Each was approximately 20 pages in length.

The Three Papers: Analysis

When asked for a statement of goals as articulated by the parties to the expansion dispute, the issues and philosophical/ideological perspectives of each are quickly delineated. It is clear that Pitt did not anticipate an expanded controversy and may not have realized the community-wide ramifications and consequences of its planned construction. The University felt there was a clear and inconvertible need for its master plan. It recognized the necessity for securing local governmental support but saw the need for only tacit community approval. Further,

> Pitt's concern with the development of the surrounding community was at best peripheral to the central issue of building an adequate physical plant . . . it had no plan to take a leading role in community-wide planning. (University perspective)

Statements from the community member and the city representative show that they have a much larger view of expansion and its impact. The city representative suggests that the city had a significant interest in Pitt expansion because its goal was to see that:

> . . . future residential, commercial and institutional development take place in Oakland in such a way as to benefit all groups.

The city was seen as accomplishing this by: maintaining existing residential densities; preserving the Forbes Avenue business district; assuring the "continued presence of the University and its orderly expansion within carefully defined borders"; giving "attention to the physical and social interface among the community, the University and the business district"; and to prevent the removal of land from the tax rolls.

The community member was especially critical of Pitt's lack of foresight in its planning of expansion. She reacts to the University and its plans as follows:

> (1) These plans are irresponsible in their impact on the surrounding community; (2) The University has delusions of grandeur which prevent it from adequately fulfilling its role as an urban university; (3) The proposed buildings are aesthetically barren, wasteful in space usage, and are poor learning environments.

In contrast, the "University paper" shows Pitt's goals to be much more narrow in scope and demonstrates further Pitt's failure to anticipate not only the community response but the community's view of expansion as involving much more than the mere construction of academic structures.

Although the paper prepared by the community member may overstate the case against the University, it is instructive because it demonstrates the divergence of viewpoints that frequently separated the University and the community. The differences that divided the two result in part from the exalted expectation many have of the University, e.g., "the University should be the most humanitarian of institutions". On the other hand, the

community's criticism of the University is based on a philosophy of education--a sort of "building for what" attitude. A few examples:

> . . . higher education (should) be applied toward alleviating physical and spiritual crises that exist in the society around it.

> The value of both the plans and the buildings are measured by how much money the state and federal governmental units are willing to expend, rather than by the actual ways in which the structures will enhance the education of students.

> The problem is not that space is being requested, so much as the kind of space that is requested. We do not feel that the present urban situation accommodates itself to new University buildings, especially when they are designed in a manner which is wasteful and inconsiderate with community land.

It may, of course, be that the root of the disagreement is one of parochial versus cosmopolitan values as the city representative suggests:

> It's basically a disagreement between a residential community that is oriented toward a particular life style and a university that sees itself as very vital to the entire city and the entire region and feels that it therefore has the right to meet its needs even if these needs create inconveniences for the residential community.

These are positions that the Pittsburgh experience has shown to be difficult to resolve.

The three writers agree that the "crunch" over expansion resulted in part from the gap between institutional planning and changing societal values. The University paper points to the very favorable political climate of past years which meant that "the University was stunned when opposition developed". But could the University have anticipated the

changing values? The city and community authors believe there were sufficient indicators. The community member writes:

> Massive expansion plans of this type had already caused widely publicized conflicts in other urban centers; the latest knowledge of urban planning and education suggested that, while the . . . plan might have been originally adequate at the time of its conception, it would be exceedingly obsolete by the time of its implementation.

Even had the University eventually recognized the indicators of change, there is disagreement over its obligation to modify plans after they are formulated and funding for implementation acquired.

The city representative acknowledges that:

> It takes a number of years for such a program to come to fruition and the community's wishes have changed since then and they (University) could not change their plans at the whim of a changing community.

These are two more points of disagreement that have made a resolution of the dispute more difficult. Again, they point up the philosophical or ideological nature of the controversy.

And there is a related issue that is also indicative of the strained relations between Pitt and the community. The community has long pressured for joint planning, but there has been no consensus as to the range of issues, the parameters of decisions, or the state of the decision process which should be affected by or subject to joint planning. The city representative makes a distinction among items appropriate for joint planning that People's Oakland and other community representatives either may not have understood or agreed with. She writes:

> The University should primarily engage in joint planning with its own students, faculty and administration about the physical shape of the buildings that it will build and about the kinds of programs that it will institute. Its joint planning process with the Oakland community should not relate so much to those issues as to those ways in which the University impinges upon the Oakland community and the ways in which the Oakland community impinges on the University.

This has been the position of the University and has, therefore, influenced their response to the community, although it does not seem to have been clearly articulated by Pitt during the tripartite and subsequent meetings with community and other interests. Nevertheless, the University paper acknowledges:

> It is clear that no University construction can be undertaken in the future unless the "community" is satisfied that it has participated in the planning process.

The same writer suggests that collaborative planning as established by ODI is essential if Pitt is to build the facilities they feel they need, but it suffers a potential disadvantage in that:

> . . . it could permit a locally-oriented group to prevent the University from building facilities that may be essential to the University's larger constituency in the county, state, and the nation.

Again, the cosmopolitan-parochial issue shows itself. The University writer suggests a further limitation of collaborative planning as a vehicle for citizen input into institutional decision-making in that:

> . . . it cannot deal with the broader questions of academic program and student population growth which create the need for facilities, yet by hampering the creation of those facilities it can have an impact on broader issues.

Once again we see the issue of joint-planning parameters.

The city representative believes in looking at the future of joint planning that it is desirable but feels that the reaching of a consensus is a necessary prerequisite to making it workable. Further, the planning process must generate successes in order to remain viable. The community author is more cynical about the potential of joint planning, but nevertheless admits that it can succeed as a process only if it reaches some immediate and short-run successes; the University writer agrees.

Summary Outline

-- The University's main concern was with the development of its own physical plant; community development was a peripheral concern. However, both the community member and the city representative show that the community was concerned with the interrelationships and consequences of residential, commercial and institutional development.

-- The University usually takes a pragmatic approach to expansion, viewing its constituency as regional and national, and thus is less concerned about expansion's negative impact on Oakland. In contrast, the community and the city are very much concerned with the University's impact on Oakland, and moreover, the community expects the University to adhere to a higher standard of citizenship and service than is usually expected of institutions.

-- The three writers agree that the University was not responsive to changes in societal values which would have required citizen input to institutional planning.

Perceptions of Oakland: The ODI Interviews[22]

During July and August of 1972, University-Urban Interface Program staff completed interviews with seventeen of the then twenty-one representatives to ODI. Our intent was to interview those representatives, or alternates, who have consistently been in attendance at the ODI meetings; vacations and related circumstances occasionally interfered, thus we were unable to interview all representatives. However, not one of those contacted refused to be interviewed. The interviewees were especially cooperative; as a result, the interviews lasted from one to one and a half hours each. A structured interview schedule was used, but interviewees were permitted to fully elaborate their responses and were encouraged to make additional comments at the interview's conclusion. The schedule was designed to elicit perceptions of Oakland as a place to live and work, ODI, and campus expansion.

Overview of Responses

Many respondents expressed concern over what the future holds for Oakland; there was a general apprehension (perhaps even pessimism) over the spread of urban blight and related problems. It was felt that should this trend continue, Oakland might not be able to maintain a viable residential population.

While there was general concern and even anger on the part of a few over the physical expansion of Oakland institutions, it was felt by many that it was not necessarily physical expansion per se that threatens the integrity of residential areas, but the failure of the institutions to

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[22]Carl Van Horn capably assisted in the interviewing of respondents.

become involved in efforts to find solutions to the spread of urban decay and related problems. Even if urban decay is merely thought to exist--as some contend--the consequences can be the same as if it were real. The institutions are seen as concerned with the implementation of what are often short-run goals with only minimal concern for long-run effects.

What these interviews have, however, made clear is that there is a basis for mutual understanding and cooperation between the diverse Oakland interests, although this may not yet be recognized or understood by either the institutions or the community.

The focal concern of Oakland residents is that viable residential neighborhoods be maintained. And for this to come about, we suggest there must: (a) exist a supply of structurally sound housing available for rent or purchase at prices within reach of middle and working class persons; (b) residents must have a diversity of commercial services available at competitive prices; (c) the physical integrity of Oakland must be maintained, e.g., streets kept in good repair and well-lighted, and the hazards and annoyances of vehicular traffic minimized; and (d) residents must feel the area is safe--that crime will be controlled. In other words, a residential neighborhood must be free (or relatively free) of urban problems.

We suggest that these are the same conditions sought (or should be sought) by institutions for their employees. Faculty, for example, are attracted to a university if it can offer them safe streets, good schools, conveniently located and competitively priced housing, and diverse and competitively priced commercial services. In other words, whatever makes for an attractive residential area also probably makes for a desirable university context/environment.

It should be noted, however, that University of Cincinnati researchers found that university-community tensions were rarely experienced by universities located in or near the central business district, and most common with universities located in high density residential areas. Thus, the Pittsburgh experience tends to support this conclusion.[23]

Responses by Question

The following is a question-by-question presentation of the interview findings. After each question is a synthesis of the responses followed by sample quotes, and then interpretive comments at the conclusion of this section.

Question 1: Please close your eyes and think of Oakland. Tell me what you see. -- A slight majority of respondents "see" Oakland in terms of people and friends. The others tend to "see" structural features such as streets, stores, and architecture.

> Family, kids--but in shadow of Cathedral.
>
> Diversity of people and architecture.
>
> Melting pot.
>
> Traffic.

Question 2: Assume for a moment you were moving away from Pittsburgh. What one or two things do you think you would remember about Oakland? -- An overwhelming majority would "remember" friends, the mix of people and people-oriented activities, and the convenient location of Oakland vis-a-vis services and other areas of the city. A few would remember the controversy over campus expansion; for example:

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[23] Robert L. Carroll, Hayden B. May and Samuel V. Noe, Jr., University-Community Tension and Urban Campus Form, University of Cincinnati, 1972, pp. 14-21.

I would remember the rotten deal the institutions are getting. (Meaning: the treatment of Pitt by those who oppose expansion.)

The way Pitt intimidated the Falk School P.T.A.

Question 3: What one or two things are most important to you about Oakland? -- A large majority report as "important" friends, the convenient location, and the availability of cultural activities.

Oakland's vitality, it's where the action is, offers anything you want!

Feeling of a happy place to live--neighborliness.

Question 4a: Of those things that are most important to you about Oakland, do you think they will be better or worse in ten years? -- A majority expect conditions to worsen in the next decade; that is, many fear that urban blight and related problems will continue. Many see both the city and the institutions as failing to make a significant effort at counteracting the spread and growth of urban problems. A few, however, expressed general optimism about the future.

Worse, because there is no change in people's desire to return to the city and Pitt is not helping.

Oakland being choked off; residences will be removed; older residents will give up.

Better, if institutions aren't stiffled--this (Oakland) is supposed to be a cultural, civic, and educational center.

I tend to be a pessimist. It is possible that things will be better if these things happen. The University must stay within its boundaries and show more concern to the community and do something for it; the community must organize itself and improve the housing situation and must encourage responsible ownership and reputable

> landlordism; the city must build a parking lot under Schenley Plaza with an attractive park on the top, generally upgrade the services and improve the other parks and repair streets in Oakland. But I tend to be a pessimist on these matters.

Question 4b: Comparing now with ten years ago, are these things better or worse? -- Most feel that present conditions have worsened in the last ten years. But again, the "conditions" referred to are usually those of urban decay and related problems, including the out migration of people to suburbs.

Question 5: Do you think Pitt/city/community are sincere about working within ODI to solve mutual problems? -- In general, respondents feel all participants are sincere. Some, however, are skeptical of Pitt's sincerity; a few feel Pitt may participate within ODI in order to accomplish its own goals without seriously working to resolve larger community-wide problems.

One respondent described ODI as a "toy" for white liberals, but nevertheless felt that the indigenous community members were sincere. A couple of interviewees questioned Pitt's credibility, contending that Pitt has often lied to the community. Members of the City Planning Department are seen as sincere, but some expressed doubts about Flaherty and city politicians.

Question 6: Thinking about the effects of Pitt's expansion on their relations with the community, do you think things are better or worse now as compared with ten years ago? Will be better or worse ten years from now? -- Reactions are mixed with a minority generally pessimistic about an improvement in Pitt's impact on the community. Optimism tends, however, to be qualified or conditional. Typical comments:

> Pitt's attempt to maintain a unitary campus is the key to the problem--must scatter, be innovative, go up like the Cathedral.
>
> Things will be better only if the Oakland-Bouquet block issue is resolved. Those who defend Pitt have an economic interest.
>
> Depends on what Pitt does--if Pitt's expansion stops now, conditions will stabilize with slight additional decay and gradual loss of residential population.
>
> Conditions will improve commercially, but will be worse for local residents.

Question 7a: What do you think are the two or three major issues that ODI must be concerned with now? -- Most answered that the immediate issue is organizational, e.g., by-laws and structure, and including also questions of definition and purpose. Other issues mentioned include the need for a mutually satisfactory resolution of the Oakland-Bouquet block question and the question of student housing.

Question 7b: What do you think are the two or three major issues that ODI must be concerned with once it is fully established/operational? -- The most frequently mentioned issue was housing--student and residential. Other frequently mentioned issues were traffic, development of an Oakland master plan, and the need for more recreational opportunities.

Question 8: On these major issues and your plans/hopes for them, there are probably many different points of view within ODI. Do you feel there is general or wide agreement on these issues, or wide disagreement? -- Respondents believe there is general agreement or consensus within ODI on goals and objectives. A few, however, suggest that differences, when they occur, come over questions of where to place emphasis.

One person, however, replied that ODI achieves "consensus by exhaustion". Another suggested that Pitt uses ODI to legitimate its actions.

Question 9: If you had your choice, would you continue to live in this area or would you prefer to live somewhere else? Why? Where? -- All agree that Oakland can and should be a good place to live. Many feel it still has many advantages over other areas of the city; in particular, they point to its convenient location, the available cultural and educational activities, and its relatively diverse mixture of people (including family and friends) and life styles.

Conclusion: The interviews make clear that although there is considerable distrust of the University, there are nevertheless larger issues whose successful resolution would be of benefit to residents, businessmen, and institutions. The respondents want to maintain Oakland's residential areas, improve city and commercial services, and structure institutional growth so that it is in harmony with the residential population.

PART IV

Introduction

In this section we offer a short sociological analysis of the expansion controversy and follow this with "Caveats and Recommendations and Lessons Learned".

We attempt to point up the social-political bases for the controversy and to suggest ways in which the community challenge might be conducted. In effect, we call for a new approach to campus expansion planning.

Particularistic Games and the General Good

Fifteen years ago, Norton Long published a provocative article in which he described "The Local Community as an Ecology of Games".[24] It is Long's contention that

> . . . the structured group activities that coexist in a particular territorial system can be looked at as games. These games provide players with a set of goals that give them a sense of success or failure. They provide them determinate roles and calculable strategies and tactics.[25]

We believe that the Long model can be useful in analyzing the controversy between Pitt and the community over expansion. This research perspective should be helpful to both researcher and administrator in understanding the dynamics of the dispute.

Long believes that although the results achieved through the territorial game playing are functional, they are nevertheless largely unplanned.

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[24] Originally published in the American Journal of Sociology, LXIV (November, 1958) and reprinted in Oliver P. Williams and Charles Press (eds.), Democracy In Urban America, Chicago, Ill.: Rand McNally and Co., 1961, pp. 367-382.

[25] Ibid., p. 369.

The results accure because the players, to accomplish their particular goals, bring about a meshing of their particular pursuits.[26] We agree with this conclusion--that is often what happens. However, changes in the political culture have resulted in considerable discontent over this system of game playing. Because, as Long points out, there are no "overall institutions" in the metropolitan area. The playing of each game may have system/area wide implications; nevertheless, the goal of each is particular/individual. In other words, in the past the achievement of the public or general good was seen as an accumulation of individual activities. This utilitarian conception is now frequently challenged and viewed by many as unacceptable.

What is changing, or to considerable extent has changed, is the attitude of many citizens. No longer are they content with quiescent acceptance of the results of particularistic game playing because they perceive the consequences as not always to their advantage. This perception has considerable validity because many of the players have learned to adapt to the absence of overall direction and coordination and therefore have accomplished a disproportionate influence over others' games. The consequence of this perception/understanding is, we believe, manifested in demands for participatory democracy, that is, an expectation that those who are affected by an institution's decisions (games) should be permitted to share in the determination of the decision(s). Thus, the Pittsburgh experience has been a pressing for joint planning of the design and subsequent use of University facilities. The University response to the community reflected their understanding of and experience in a game playing process that resembled Long's 1958 description. Thus, the University assumed

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[26] Ibid., p. 372.

that, in the long run, the costs to the community from campus expansion would be overshadowed by Pitt's contribution to the general good. The local experience deviated from the Long model because certain city representatives and community members decided to weigh "costs and benefits". It remains to be seen whether in the long run the local ecology of games will be altered because of recent changes in political values or if particularistic game playing will prevail.

This is not to suggest, however, that the community is or has been outside the ecology of games structure, rather the "community" has not had in the past significant or instrumental affect on the games of others. But now we have a group of activists (People's Oakland) whose game--as one cynic puts it--treats the "community (Oakland) as a sandbox". That is probably an overly-jaded characterization but nevertheless reflects--and fairly accurately, we believe--the view held by a number of Oakland residents, a few University members, and even some businessmen. And that is, that People's Oakland is a fluid grouping of interests represented by a number of transients (meaning non-Oakland residents or University-associated intellectuals) who have joined together on the basis of a shared ideology. Their ideology--at least as perceived by some--is one of dislike for the University coupled with a liberal or intellectual interest in helping those less fortunate, i.e., Oakland's working and ethnic classes. This ideology, we believe, includes also a rather romantic view of what a city is and what it should be. Nevertheless, People's Oakland's vision of Oakland is or should be identical with the University's, and that is, Oakland's residential population should be maintained and kept viable.

The dispute between Pitt and the community (and the dispute may be really a clash of values) can also be seen as the result of a discrepancy between the "creator of urban environment and the user",[27] assuming we can consider Pitt the creator and the residential population as the user. A consistent theme running through the University-community negotiations of the last two and one-half years has been the question of University impact on the Oakland community. The University's position has been that it should have the same rights and responsibilities as other Oakland "residents", and further the University presence is generally beneficial to the city and region and thus there may be some costs the local community must bear in exchange for the larger public good derived from the University.

The community adversaries acknowledge the generally positive effects derived from the University's presence, but believe that the viable residential-institutional mix is so delicate that those who are affected by institutions (their presence, policies, programs) should also share in the making of institutional decisions that have a potential community-wide impact.

The controversy is due in part to the "community-centered" character of People's Oakland and others who have challenged University expansion.

> Community-centered people . . . tend to the upper-middle classes. They seek not just a home . . . but a home that is within easy access to a series of shared recreation and civic facilities, yet within a scheme that protects them from undesirable land uses or undesirable neighbors.[28]

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[27] William Michelson, Man and His Urban Environment: A Sociological Analysis, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1970, p. 133.

[28] Ibid., p. 118.

It is to this grouping that a hillside dormitory that would infringe upon a school while filling a green space and cluttering a view serves as a "critical event" and thus rallys opposition to University plans. The conceptualization of residents as community-centered people offers explanation for the history of opposition to the University's presence from Schenley Farms and Heights residents--both areas of upper-middle class families and source of some of the leadership for the community challenge.

What is interesting, however, is that the more moderate income residents of South Oakland have not disputed the representational or leadership role of People's Oakland and many have openly expressed their support. For example, on one occasion many residents displayed signs in their yards stating "This House Is Not For Sale To Pitt". Residents have also expressed their belief that the University's presence has resulted in severe traffic congestion; high-priced, overcrowded and deteriorating housing; and an increase in crime due to the large number of students who are easy victims.

Caveats, Recommendations, and Lessons Learned

The following comments fall into two categories: the first suggests the necessary ingredients for a successful community challenge to campus expansion, and the second the prerequisites for a successful University response to that challenge.

Prerequisites for a successful confrontation: Here we define "successful confrontation" as one in which the community accomplishes most of its goals, and accordingly, the University does not. The accomplishments of the community opposition are striking: the University has cancelled plans for a $13 million high-rise dorm; Pitt delayed construction of and then altered plans for the Law and Education-Social Sciences complex (at an additional cost of $5 million); the community is

now organized (as manifested in or through ODI), and a joint-planning process has been established (through ODI).

The University: The University found itself out-maneuvered and on the defensive because the senior administration does not seem to have been cognizant of or responsive to changes in social values (political culture). Growing out of and manifested in the student revolt of the sixties was the ideal of participatory democracy; that is, those who are affected by institutional decisions should have some input into the making of these decisions/policies. Or put another way, it is a spreading of participation-democracy to the grassroots and therefore is anti-elitist in concept.

Universities responded to participatory demands at the student level; and as a result, students now serve, e.g., on Boards of trustees, participate in varying degrees in faculty meetings, and other aspects of university governance. All are aware that these changes were hard fought and sometimes came only after extreme and violent confrontations. The point is, however, that many colleges and universities adopted student-centered changes in their governance structure without personally experiencing violent confrontation. Yet, universities may not have fully understood the nature, dimensions, and implications of the student revolt for other societal groupings and relationships. Locally, when the controversy arose over expansion, the University did not anticipate it, nor did the University seem to understand its nature; and therefore, we believe, the controversy escalated to the detriment of both the University and the community.

What we are suggesting is that many, if not most, of the problems the University suffers in connection with its expansion program are directly associated with the University's adherence to traditional planning procedures and processes. This means that the University conducts expansion

from its finance or physical plant offices and therefore maintains a "dollars and cents", "bricks and mortar" approach. At Pittsburgh, when community opposition developed, the University refused to treat seriously the challenge because it came from self-appointed, non-institutional (non-elitist) interests. For many months, the University pursued a "wait and see" attitude, and when it was necessary to respond to community questions, demands, or threats, the University could not (or did not) get beyond a financial or engineering perspective to the larger issues of educational philosophy and neighborhood viability that the community introduced. Ironically, the University did have staff members who understood the political dynamics and ramifications of the controversy. But these staff members--who forecast the direction the controversy was moving and therefore understood and anticipated the response the University should and would eventually take--were located on the Public Affairs side of the University, and the expansion planning/decision-making was being directed by Finance and Physical Plant. Early in the controversy, Public Affairs (Program Development and Public Affairs as it was known then) might have been able to control the University response but because of a traditional planning perspective, the locus of decision-making reverted to Finance.

The ill feeling and distrust that characterized institution-community relations were exaccerbated also by the University's tendency to use a "P.R." response. In other words, the use of essentially a "hard sell" or media-oriented approach that emphasized "what's good for Pitt is good for the community". What now should be painfully apparent is that communications is a two-way process and the establishment of a process is the proper course of action and not the "hard sell".

The Community: What made the community especially effective in its adversary role is that its organizing force (People's Oakland) was composed of middle- and upper-middle class intellectuals who knew how to play politics. The students, faculty, professionals, and middle-class residents who make up the nucleus of the community's opposition force understood how the political system operates and had the political, social and business connections necessary to taking the initiative away from Pitt. Moreover, there occurred that "critical event" necessary to the establishment of a social movement, and that was the University plan for a high-rise dorm that was to alter the playground of a school, increase people and traffic congestion in the vicinity of the school as well as the middle and upper-middle class neighborhood adjacent to the school. In addition, the dorm--if constructed--would occupy a green space and serve as an imposing reminder of the institution's presence in a once separate and autonomous residential area. That is, a community-centered people were confronted with what seemed to them to be the encroachment of institutions in their neighborhood.

What is interesting about the event is that the school (Falk School) is "an integral part of the University, operated and financed by the University under the direction of the School of Education".[29] Children of Pitt faculty constitute a significant part of the Falk student body. It seems clear also that Falk School administrators were aware of the dorm plans and had been for about three years.[30]

The City: The City Planning Department no longer had a traditional urban renewal philosophy; instead, the new Director, who had held a senior

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[29] Minutes, Facilities Committee of the Board of Trustees, October 12, 1970.

[30] Ibid.

position in the Philadelphia Planning Department during the height of Temple's problems with their neighboring community, added a community planning unit and hired eight community planning specialists who shared his citizen advocacy philosophy. Although the University had an outmoded perspective of the city-community game, the City Planning Department fully understood recent changes in the political culture and had made the appropriate adjustment in their organization and operation.

The changes in the Planning Department came with the election of Peter Flaherty, an independent Democrat with an anti-establishment, new politics style. Thus, the community had, at the very least, the moral support of the city administration. In addition, the city could and did help the organization of community opposition to Pitt's expansion by City Planning's insistence on the establishment of a University-community dialogue, and for example, in the city's control over zoning and construction permits.

There is another aspect of the changes in the political culture that has assisted the community challenge, and this is the decline of machine politics--nationally and locally. As Ira Katznelson suggests:

> The now largely defunct classic machines exercised their control function by controlling both the input and output sides of politics; they provided an organized, coherent access link to government, and acted as the key distributor of political rewards.[31]

But, in Pittsburgh, and nationally, the machine was gone; Flaherty had defeated a machine of more than 30 years standing. Even though the

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[31] Ira Katznelson, "Participation and Political Buffers in Urban America," presented at the Annual Meeting of the APSA, Washington, D. C., September, 1972, p. 13.

University had acted ineptly prior to August, 1971, it undoubtedly would have been more resistent to the community demands had the Democratic machine continued to control City Hall.

Without the machine, the governmental bureaucracy controls only the output side of politics unless it creates linkage or neighborhood pressure groups as, e.g., City Planning seems to be doing in Pittsburgh with assistance to and sanction of neighborhood organizations. The city might establish an ODI so that it can potentially have control of both the input and output sides--even though the Mayor and Planning may have larger philosophical reasons for organizing local groups, the result is the same.

What has made this "new" process difficult to operate and deal with is that

> . . . whereas traditional machine politicians did not cloak their particularism with an ideological superstructure, the new reformers try to obscure their aims by co-opting the rhetoric of democratic participation and community control.[32]

The Pittsburgh experience is illustrative.

The rise of neighborhood or community level pressure groups may be a desirable phenomenon, especially if urban blight and decay is to be counteracted. Umbrella organizations such as ODI may constitute a necessary parapolitical structure which could have the potential for translating or mobilizing the values, interests, and commitments of those formally outside the established power structure into political opinion and action and thus help maintain the political pluralism many view as vital to the viability of a democratic society.[33]

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[32] Ibid., p. 14.

[33] Scott Greer and Peter Orleans, "The Mass Society and the Parapolitical Structure," Chapter 11 of Scott Greer, et. al., The New Urbanization, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968.

This brings us to our conclusions regarding the necessary prerequisites for and/or composition of a "successful" University response. Successful as used here is meant to convey a term of some considerable relativity, rather than an absolute measurement: has/is the University's relations with the community improved and are University goals being accomplished?

Locus of Power Within University Hierarchy: Our research suggests that the Chancellor, and perhaps his senior staff, should function as a policy planner, in that he establishes broad policy guidelines but has little or no immediate/direct involvement with policy implementation. We say this because the scope of the Chancellor's duties are such that he must parsimoniously guard his time and therefore can ill afford to become personally involved in policy implementation where lower staff (at the Vice Chancellor level or below) are hired specifically for that purpose. The Chancellor and other senior level administrators cannot be expected to have the specialized expertise necessary for policy-program design and implementation. Again, their role is to establish the goals and assign to experts lower in the hierarchy the discretionary authority and responsibility for goal implementation.

Perhaps the State Department analogy is appropriate. Here the ambassadors in the field carry out policies that were established in Washington, but seldom does the Secretary of State become personally involved at the local levels on a day-to-day basis unless there is a crisis. We believe this analogy or model is especially appropriate for the conduct of campus expansion and attendant community relations. As a general rule, we believe the Chancellor should refrain from direct contact with, e.g., the community or City Planning Department. For the Chancellor to personally intervene in a process may cause an interruption of the relationships between lower

staff and, say, city or community representatives. The Chancellor's intervention can reduce the effectiveness of his staff who must deal with the process on a daily basis because intervention can make the staff person hesitant to act when the situation calls for an ad hoc decision (in other words, staff hesitation in assuming responsibility). In addition, the city official or community representative may no longer want to negotiate with the staff person if the Chancellor is available. Finally, the necessity for the Chancellor to have an overall perspective usually precludes his understanding of the particular dynamics of a situation, that is, he may have no sense of the history of the process that the staff person has established. But even should the Chancellor's personal involvement be required, it is important for the successful future conduct of the relationship or process that it be clearly understood, by all parties, the responsibilities assigned to particular staff persons and that they (staff) have appropriate authority to act on behalf of the institution/the Chancellor.

In sum, we are suggesting that the Chancellor use staff as informational inputs to his determination of overall policy guidelines and goals, and that lower staff experts receive broad discretionary authority to act (implement policy) so long as their decisions are generally consistent with the guidelines the Chancellor has established. Continuity in University contact with community interests is necessary to the success of a community relations program, as is the appropriate internal University coordination necessary for accomplishing a single effort.

Planning: Many of the problems which beset the conduct of community relations prior to the Summer of 1971 result from the failure of the University to establish policy positions and long-range plans (goals), including the consideration of contingencies and the establishment of

priorities. Again, we suggest that many universities avoided major problems during the years of student restlessness because they tried to anticipate student actions and formulated appropriate contingency plans and strategies. We are assuming also that community relations planning will be conducted by those with appropriate "people-oriented" experience. Experience gained through, for example, labor negotiations or community organizing may be advisable.

Communications: We strongly agree with the Chancellor's memo of September 20, 1971,[34] in which he called for a coordinated internal effort under the direction of the Office of Public Affairs. It is clear that activities undertaken in the areas of Finance and Operations can influence community relations. For example, purchases of property for investment purposes can and do affect the University's community relations efforts. Moreover, we believe that the opening of regularized communication with the community (the process) is of equal or perhaps greater importance than the substance of the communication.[35] Universities should understand that, for the most part, secret decision-making can never be effective, if for no other reason than the University is too decentralized and diffuse to keep secrets. If rumors need correction, then serious harm has been done to the institution's credibility. It is far better to have an open decision structure that inhibits the creation and spread of rumors. Thus, we recommend that universities conduct their affairs in an open manner and open communications with all community segments who express an interest in University affairs. Because of the abundant expertise on the administrative and faculty sides of the University, the identification of "publics" should

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[34] Wesley W. Posvar, "Memo to Senior Administrators, University Policy Regarding Community and Governmental Relations," September 20, 1971.

[35] Roland L. Warren, Truth, Love, and Social Change, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1971.

prove no problem. For example, within a few months after the beginning of the University-Urban Interface Program, its Director, Dr. Robert C. Brictson, had sought out the appropriate experts, who identified emerging community opposition, forecast problem areas, and recommended solutions. Also in October, 1970, Louis A. Tronzo, Office of Governmental Relations, drafted a memo cautioning that unless the hillside dorm issue was resolved, it would eventually include the Forbes project.. Time has substantiated all forecasts and recommendations.

What we are suggesting is that--in the short-run at least--the University has both directly and indirectly contributed to its community problems. We have suggested the steps that need to be taken to remedy community conflicts; in large measure, this means that the University must first get "its own house in order". We should emphasize also that the University must understand that it frequently contributes to its "community problems" by public pronouncements which encourage the community to believe that the University has both the ability and the will to solve that ubiquitous pot-pourri of "urban problems". An example:

> . . . we are on the verge of a new era of public involvement of the university . . . I refer to an unprecedented and qualitative change in the role of the university, a role that will relate to a fundamental transformation of the human condition in this country . . .

Although this statement comes from the 1968 Inaugural Address of the present Chancellor of the University of Pittsburgh, it is but one example of the kind of pronouncements made by University administrators across the nation. It is statements of this kind that unwittingly feed citizen expectations about the possible role of the university in the city and thus frequently return to haunt the well-intentioned progenitor of the statement

when the realities of the situation prevent (as they often do) the fulfilling of the promise. Or at least the fulfilling of the promise as interpreted by non-university groups. The quotation we cite above undoubtedly refers to, e.g., open enrollment policies. It can easily be interpreted, however, by groups with little or no university experience, that the university intends to enter an action-service role in the community. We are all frequently reminded that the halcyon days of higher education are over and therefore universities can no longer expect or attempt to service the needs of all societal groupings. It may be that universities never were "that" capable, and that they can best fulfill their service role/goal by performing well their teaching and research roles.

Our study indicates, however, that there is a way out that will benefit both University and community. The community's fundamental concern is for the maintenance and development of the residential areas--the creation and maintenance of areas that can attract and keep families. This means, as we have pointed out above, that the area be kept free of urban blight and be able to offer appropriate family-oriented commercial services.

These are the same conditions that are, or should be, sought by universities. Faculty, for example, are attracted to a university if it can offer them safe streets, good schools, conveniently located and competitively priced housing, and diverse and competitively priced commercial services. Notwithstanding the town-gown problems that frequently accompany student-resident contacts, an attractive residential area also makes for a desirable university environment.

This, then, is the basis for working out solutions to mutual concerns. If the community adversaries need an "enemy" as the rallying point for their organizational efforts, the same applies to establishing a mutually

satisfactory university-community relationship. Where the University was the community's enemy, the enemy now becomes, e.g., absentee landlords, or the city for its failure to enforce building codes or keep the streets safe. Thus, there are any number of objects for common concern available. Oakland Development, Inc. (ODI) may be the vehicle for bringing the community and University together.

But for it to become workable and to remain so, representatives to ODI need to define the "enemy" and then create, invent, and share some accomplishments. The immediate issue that could turn into an accomplishment would be a mutually satisfactory use for the two-blocks area. In the long-run, however, there must be some accomplishment of larger magnitude that is free of the potential taint of "community versus university" that characterizes the two-blocks issue. At this point, the city is a promising candidate for the enemy because it is moving ahead with the construction of a skating rink, the plans for which were not brought before ODI, which is the organization encouraged by the city to act as a neighborhood planning review board for the Oakland area. This might be the issue that gets ODI beyond the more parochial issue of University expansion.

A consensus--institutional and community--on what constitutes the public good does seem possible. But, ODI is now at the crossroads and even with goal and program consensus, the mechanism for carrying out the implications of that consensus may not be available; at this writing, the representatives to ODI have not yet approved by-laws, although approval does appear imminent.

All indicators suggest that it is in the best interest of both the community and the University (as well as other institutions) that an umbrella type of organization, such as ODI, be kept viable. A workable arrangement,

however, will probably come only as the consequence of a willingness on the part of the community and the University to compromise on their individual goals and preferences in order to accomplish goals with a community-wide impact.[36] The University (also other institutions and businesses) must recognize and consider the potential community-wide impact of its policies and programs, and the community must understand that there are certain categories of University program and activity in which they can have little or no input. Each interest will have certain areas of autonomy on which compromise will be rare, but generally each must understand the wider impact of their activities and subsequently conduct their affairs in a cooperative and empathetic fashion.

A consensus, however, may be less essential to the attainment of goals through ODI if only the participants would (a) move away from the all too frequent zero-sum game situation in which one interest gains at the expense of the other, and (b) emphasis be placed on coalition building (temporary collaborative relationships) around specific goals, in preference to alliances which are more permanent collaborative relationships focusing on a wide-range of goals.[37]

Although the University and community have made much progress toward the establishment of mutually satisfying relationships, we are concerned that the parties to ODI do not share our sense of urgency regarding the generation of funding for ODI. We believe it is imperative that ODI be established as a viable organization, and this means funding sufficient

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[36]For a discussion of the difficulties in determining the public or community good, see: John Friedman, "The Public Interest and Community Participation," Journal of the American Institute of Planners, Vol. 39 (January, 1973), pp. 2, 4-7. A "Commentary" by Herbert J. Gans in the same issue, pp. 3, 10-12, suggests that a determinization of what constitutes the public interest comes only with the understanding that personal goals are really political goals and goal consensus is best achieved through a political process.

for hiring at least a director or chairman, and perhaps a secretary. An umbrella-type planning review organization seems the only suitable mechanism for solving Oakland's urban blight-decay problems. Thus, ODI could serve the interests of the institutions, businesses, and residents. However, its successes and promise are a result of the vitality of volunteers and the problems facing Oakland are so serious that one should not depend on the necessary voluntarism to be available in the future. We, therefore, strongly recommend that the representatives to ODI move expeditiously toward approval of by-laws and then immediately address themselves to the question of funding. Even if the institutions have to assume the funding burden, it is their best interest to do so.

In other words, ODI has the potential for emerging as Oakland's "overall institution". ODI may help Oakland overcome the deleterious effects of particularistic game playing. The city's six-year budget makes clear that Oakland does not figure prominently in its plans, therefore, the need exists for an Oakland pressure group and ODI has that potential, too. Finally, ODI can provide the arena for working out solutions to competing and conflicting group demands and interests.

In the past, universities have benignly neglected their surrounding communities;[38] they can no longer afford to do so. We suggest that the time has come wherein community development projects--especially those of a physical nature--should not be undertaken without an "environmental impact" study being completed first. What appears to be discrete actions or policies usually have system-wide impact. ODI would seem to be the appropriate organization to stimulate, coordinate, and review community projects and their attendant "impact" studies.

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[38]This particular characterization is George Nash's ("Miscellaneous Comments on Community Involvement by Institutions of Higher Education," unpublished, 1972). Our research and that of others supports Nash's

Our suggestion for impact studies as a prerequisite to community approval of planned construction projects is obviously an admonition to institutions. However, it is directed also to the city and the business community. We are especially concerned that Oakland businessmen understand that ODI is (or should be) more than a mechanism for resolving University expansion disputes. ODI as a comprehensive planning review group (and this is what we see its proper role to be) can be a functional organization only if the business community seriously participates in its activities. To date, the Oakland Chamber of Commerce has a constricted view of ODI--they see ODI as a means of resolving a dispute between the University and certain Oakland residents.

SUMMARY

In recent years, universities have increasingly found themselves challenged by any number of their various constituencies. In particular, challenges have come from disgruntled students, faculty, and state legislators. More recently, the complaining voices of the residents of university districts have been raised.

The University of Pittsburgh is located in the Oakland section of Pittsburgh--the educational and cultural center of the city and also a multi-ethnic working and middle-class residential area.

In almost three years of our research of the community challenge to Pitt expansion, we have found that there appears to be a commonality of issues involved in citizen opposition to University expansion. The issues raised in the Cox Commission Report[39] on Columbia University's experience with their neighboring community are identical to the issues raised by People's Oakland and others who objected to Pitt's conduct of its campus relations.

The Commonality of Issues

(1) Is Campus Expansion Necessary? -- The University did not attempt to communicate its plans at the grassroots level, and when challenged by the community was hesitant to enter into a dialogue with concerned residents. Furthermore, there were a number of incidents that suggested a discrepancy between University words and deeds, and thereby diminished the credibility of University statements.

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[39] Crisis at Columbia, New York: Random House, 1968.

(2) Did the University Make Long-Range Plans and Were the Plans Revealed to the Community? -- By 1970, Pitt had a well-developed master plan complete with a scale model. However, it has been the practice of the University to inform the community of its plans only after the plans were finalized. Yet, those exercised members of the local community expected participation in the planning process.

(3) Is the University Sensitive to Problems of Resident Relocation? -- Because of the University's Summer of 1971 agreement with the community to modify its expansion plans, very few residents were relocated. But even when the University anticipated the implementation of its master plan, which would have caused the removal of several hundred residents, it had no plan for relocation assistance beyond the payment of nominal moving costs.

(4) Has the University Planned for Multi-Use Buildings? -- This continues to be an issue between Pitt and the community and is complicated by financial and legal questions.

(5) Has the University Made an Effort to Reconcile Differences With The Community? -- During the first phase of the controversy, Pitt was on the defensive and reluctant to enter into a dialogue with its community critics. However, within the context of ODI, a dialogue has been regularized. Perhaps the major obstacle to improving University-community relations has been the University's adherence to a traditional planning perspective in which communication with the community was limited to a few select groups.

Myths and Realities

The University's controversy with the community has permitted us to delineate four mistaken assumptions or myths.

One myth is that universities, in launching campus expansion plans, need only respond to their traditional constituencies. The reality, as shown by the Pittsburgh experience, is that universities must take into account the total range of public, private, and political interests which may singularly or cooperatively work against an institution's plans for expansion.

A second myth is that the local institution is unique; that is, its experiences are unrelated to that of others. However, there were similar experiences which were applicable, and these are suggested by the Cox Commission Report.

A third myth has to do with changes in the national political culture and its applicability to the local scene; and this is, in part, what makes the experiences of other universities comparable. Participation by affected citizens in the drafting of plans is an increasingly common practice and expectation.

A fourth myth suggests that those who object most strenuously to expansion are those most directly affected, that is, those who are to be displaced. At Pitt, the most determined opposition came from persons whose interests were geographically on the periphery of the expansion area.

The July 28 Agreement

On the afternoon of July 28, 1971, representatives of Pitt, People's Oakland, the South Oakland Citizens Council, and the City of Pittsburgh reached an agreement which was publicly presented at a tripartite meeting that evening. Vice Chancellor for Finance, Edison Montgomery, made the presentation before the group and in his announcement reviewed a number of points of agreement, including the following three:

(a) "The University will no longer seek to undertake development in the Forbes Field area in accordance with its existing plans";

(b) Joint planning should "commence immediately with the University, the city, the community, and the state for the use" of the Forbes Field area and adjacent properties owned or used by the University;

(c) "In the joint planning effort, provision will be made for the development of new commercial space and 'people-oriented' space somewhere in the above-described area as well as space for University needs."

Campus Expansion Phase II (August, 1971 to Present)

Following the July 28 agreement, the Chancellor reorganized his senior administrative staff and assigned to the newly reorganized Office of Public Affairs the primary responsibility for communications development with regard to campus expansion. In so doing, the University was attempting to improve internal coordination of campus expansion activities and to attempt to speak to the public with a single voice.

When Public Affairs assumed its new role, there occurred a major change in the University's expansion planning. For the first time, University planning included the consideration of strategies, tactics, priorities, alternatives, and contingencies. Thus, as a result of the leadership of Public Affairs, the University moved from its defensive position regarding expansion and began to take the initiative.

Relations with the community also began to improve. This change came about, we believe, because (a) the community had won some significant victories, and (b) communications between the University and community became more regularized with the participants functioning less as

adversaries and more as negotiators.

The University's decision to communicate with the community and therefore to move away from its reliance upon public relations (the hard sell), significantly contributed to the improvement of relations with the community.

Prerequisites to a Successful University Response to the Community Challenge

(1) (a) The Chancellor should use his staff as informational inputs to his determination of overall policy guidelines and goals, and

(b) Staff experts should receive broad discretionary authority to implement policy so long as their decisions are generally consistent with the guidelines established by the Chancellor.

(2) The Office of Public Affairs should have the major responsibility for coordinating and conducting relations with the community.

(3) Campus expansion planning must include consideration of contingencies and the establishment of priorities.

(4) The opening of regularized communications with the community is of equal or perhaps greater importance than the substance of the communication.

(5) (a) Being a good neighbor may require the University to compromise on its goals and plans,

(b) In that the University and community must cooperate in the accomplishment of community-wide goals.

(6) An umbrella organization such as ODI is probably the best mechanism for accomplishing mutually satisfying solutions to community problems.



UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH PLAN 1



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APPENDIX A

Membership of Oakland Development, Incorporated

April 1973

Carnegie Institute and Libraries

Darragh-Lothrop Club

Schenley Farms Civic Association

Model Cities Neighborhood Planning Team

University of Pittsburgh

Terrace Village Civic Club

People's Oakland

Allequippa Street/Breckenridge Block Club

Oakland Chamber of Commerce

Centre Heights Association for Preservation

Frazier Area Club

University Health Center

Carlow College

South Oakland Citizen's Council

Pitt Tenant's Union

Carnegie-Mellon University

APPENDIX B

BYLAWS OF OAKLAND DEVELOPMENT, INC.

Article I

Purpose

The purpose of Oakland Development, inc., shall be to initiate and implement a joint planning process for the Oakland area, and to engage in programs for the betterment of the area. Our goals are: to improve Oakland as a community in which to live, work, and study; to achieve a fair and trustful working relationship among the residents, institutions, and businesses whose needs and desires will shape Oakland's future; and to encourage all people interested in Oakland to participate with us in finding solutions to the problems of our community. The planning process will include review and coordination of plans of member groups and development of new plans or alternatives where a need for such is perceived. The Corporation may also engage in such other programs for the betterment of the area as are approved in accordance with these bylaws.

Article II

Areas Concerned

The organization shall conduct its activities in the area defined by the attached map, dated February 9, 1972.

Article III

Membership

Section 1 Initial Membership

The organizations making up the initial membership of ODI will be:

Organization Name	Classification	Organization Name	Class
Allequippa Street Block Club	Community	Department of City Planning	Governmental
Boundary Street Block Club	Community	Frazier Area Club	Community
Darragh - Lothrop	Community	Oakland Neighborhood Planning Team	Community
Schenley Farms Civic Association	Community	Oakland Chamber of Commerce	Affiliated Institutional
State Department of Community Affairs	Governmental	The Carnegie Complex	Institutional
Carlow College	Institutional	University of Pittsburgh	Institutional
Pitt Tenant Union	Affiliated Institutional Group	Terrace Village Civic Association	Community
Centre Heights Civic Association	Community	The University Health Center Hospitals	Institutional
Peoples Oakland	Community	South Oakland Citizens Council	Communtiy
Carnegie Mellon University	Institutional		
Community Members - 10 Institutional - 5		Affiliated Interest Groups - 2 Governmental - 2	

Section 2 Eligibility

A group eligible for membership will fit into any one of four categories:

1. Community Organization - a group of year-round residents of Oakland, organized for the purpose of providing services for residents or promoting the welfare of residents in a specified geographic area. A minority of the members of such an organization may be non-residents or academic-year residents.
2. Institution - an incorporated body, located in Oakland, whose primary function is to provide health, education, or other public services.
3. Government - any agency of the city, state or federal government engaged in programs affecting the area of concern.
4. Affiliated interest group - a group not belonging in the above categories, whose members are deemed by the ODI membership to have a personal and clearly justifiable interest in the future of Oakland.

Section 3 Voting Rights of Members

The voting membership will be balanced in such a way as to always consist of at least 51% Community Organization representation. Each Community, Institution, and Affiliated member will have one vote. Government members will always be non-voting.

Each member group will designate one person as its permanent representative to ODI, and also two alternates.

Section 4 Admission of New Members

The Membership Committee will review all applications for membership. Priority will be given to groups not overlapping, in stated purpose or geographic area, groups already admitted. If admission of an Institutional or Affiliated group

would cause Community representation to fall below 51%, admission will be delayed until additional Community groups are admitted. After review, the Membership Committee will make a recommendation to the membership. In seating new members, the voting procedure set forth in Article 4, Section 4 will be followed.

Section 5 Vacancies

If a delegate or his alternate misses three consecutive regular meetings, the organization will be sent a letter asking if it still wishes to participate. If the organization fails to send a representative or alternate to the next regular meeting, it will be dropped from membership.

Article IV

Meetings

Section 1 Regular Meetings

The members shall meet at least monthly, at a regular time, at a public place within the area of concern. A notice stating the day, hour, and location of the meeting, together with an agenda for the meeting, must be received personally or by mail to all members at least five days before the meeting date. Requests for items to appear on the agenda should be made to the Secretary. It is mandatory to accept for placement on the agenda any item requested in writing by four or more members, submitted at least ten days prior to the meeting date.

Section 2 Special Meetings

Special meetings may be called by the President or at the request of 1/3 of the membership. Notice shall be given at least 48 hours prior to meeting.

Section 3 Quorum

A quorum will consist of 2/3 of the voting membership, and a majority must be members from Community Organizations.

Section 4 Matters Requiring Special Voting Procedures

The following matters require special voting procedure: 1) initiation of new or extension of ongoing projects or programs; 2) approval of programs or plans, or changes in such, of member organizations or of ODI; 3) seating of new members.

An item in the above categories must be on the agenda included with the meeting notice (Sec. 1) in order for a vote to be taken on it. The item must be approved by a 2/3 majority. If a quorum is not present when the item comes up for a vote, a legal majority vote will be 3/4 of the voting members present at the nest meeting; for which the item must also be on the written agenda. A majority of the voting members present must be from Community Organizations.

Section 5 Planning Procedure

The following guidelines will be followed by members during the joint planning process:

1. All members will submit to the board for consideration and recommendation all projects being planned for as of January, 1972; and at any time thereafter. The board will be primarily concerned with plans for physical changes and development, but will also need to consider related programmatic aspects. Criteria for consideration of plans will include:

a. Program - Who is to be served, how, and why.

b. Physical and environmental impact on surrounding area, with regard to pedestrian and vehicular traffice, congestion, open space requirements, aesthetics, zoning and legal requirements.

c. Phasing of projects or time frame.

2. Members will submit to the board multiple copies of data used in determining need for and form of projects, as well as any other relevant information requested by the Board.

3. Members will submit to the Board all maps, charts, drawings, and specifications for projects under consideration.

4. Members will bring to the Board any technical assistance available to them if necessary to provide information for adequate evaluation.

5. Members will provide the above information at an early stage in their planning of projects, and well in advance of the board meetings at which the projects are to be discussed. Board members must be able to consider adequately the need and the existing plans, and develop alternatives if they wish, without the threat of planning and construction deadlines.

6. Each member will agree not to implement a plan until the board has considered its merits and alternatives and made a recommendation.

7. It is assumed that all members of the group have joined freely and with the intention of acting in good faith. Members will therefore agree to amend and adapt their plans if at all possible in accordance with the recommendations of the organization.

Article V

Officers

The officers of the organization shall be President, two Vice Presidents, the Secretary and the Treasurer. The officers will be elected in accordance with the provisions of this article. The membership may elect one or more alternate secretaries or one or more alternate treasurers if it is considered desireable. Any two or more offices may be held by the same person except the office of President and Secretary.

Section 1. - Election and term of office

The officers of the organization shall be elected annually by the membership. New offices may be created and filled at any meeting of the membership. Each officer shall hold office until his successor has been duly elected A vacancy in any office which occurs for any reason may be filled by election until the expiration of the term. Any officer may be re-elected to office, with no limit on the number of terms he may serve.

Section 2 President

The President shall preside at all meetings of the members. He may sign with the secretary and treasurer or any other proper office of the organization authorized by the membership any deeds, mortgage, bonds, contracts or other instruments which the membership has authorized to be executed, except in cases where the signing and the execution shall be explicitly delegated to some other officer or agent of the organization. In general he shall perform all duties related to the office of the President and such other duties which shall be prescribed by the membership from time to time.

Section 3 Vice President

In the absence of the President or in the event of his inability or refusal to act the first Vice President shall perform the duties of the President and when so acting shall have all of the duties of and shall be subject to all the restrictions placed upon the president. Any Vice President shall perform other duties as from time to time may be assigned to him by the President or by the membership.

Section 4 Treasurer

He shall have charge and custody and be responsible for all funds and securities of the organization. He shall receive and give prompt receipt for money due and payable to the organization from any source whatsoever and deposit such monies in the name of the organization in such bank as shall be selected by the membership. In general, he shall perform all duties incidental to the office of Treasurer and such other duties as from time to time may be assigned to him by the President or by the membership. The Treasurer shall report to the membership at least quarterly on the financial activities of the organization. If required by the membership the Treasurer shall obtain a bond for the faithful discharge of his duties, at such time and with such surety as the membership shall prescribe.

Section 5 Secretaries

The Secretary shall keep the minutes of the meetings of the membership in one or more books provided for that purpose; see that all notices are duly given in accordance with the provisions of these bylaws; be the custodian of the organization records and the seal of the corporation if the organization

is incorporated, and see that the seal of the corporation is affixed to all documents, the execution of which on behalf of the corporation under its seal be duly authorized in accordance with the provisions of the bylaws; keep a register of the post office address of each member and in general perform all duties incidental to the office of secretary and such other duties as from time to time may be assigned to him by the president or by the membership.

Section 6 Staff

The membership or its designee may employ full- or part-time employees as is needed to carry out the programs of the Corporation. The salary or wages and the terms of employment shall be set by the membership or its designee.

Article VI

Committees

Standing Committees - The membership shall have the following standing committee as well as any other standing committees that may be later prescribed:

Section 1 Executive Committee

The Executive Committee shall be composed of the elected officers and may meet between regular meetings of the membership to take such action on behalf of or make such recommendations to the membership as shall be required of the organization. The Executive Committee may not act on behalf of the membership on non-procedural items.

Section 2. - Membership Committee

A Membership Committee of no fewer than three members of the organization, one each from the different categories of voting members shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the membership. This committee shall pass upon the qualifications of those applying for membership in the appropriate category subject to such regulations as may have been designated from time to time by the membership.

Section 3. - Funding and Finance Committee

This committee will seek funds for the hiring of staff, development activities, and other financial matters. The treasurer shall be a member.

Section 4 Other Committees

The membership by resolution adopted by the majority of the members may designate and appoint one or more other committees to perform such functions as may be designated by the membership; provided that no such committee may take action which is reserved to the membership under these bylaws.

Article VII

Checks and Funds

Section 1. - Checks

Checks, drafts or other orders for the payment of money, notes or other evidence of indeptedness issued in the name of the organization shall be signed by such person at least two in number and in such manner as shall from time to time be determined by the resolution of the membership. In

the absence of such determination by the membership such incidents shall be signed by the Treasurer or an Assistant Treasurer and the President or Vice President of the organization.

Section 2. - Gifts

The membership may accept on behalf of the organization any contribution, gift or bequest for the general purpose or for any special purpose of the organization.

Article VIII

Books and Records

The organization shall keep correct and complete books of accounts and shall also keep minutes of the proceedings of the membership meetings and of those committee meetings having any of the authority of the membership. The record shall give the names and addresses of the members present. All books and records to the organization may be inspected by any member or his agent or attorney for any proper purpose at any reasonable time. The financial records of the organization shall be audited annually with a report to the membership.

Article IX

Fiscal Year

The fiscal year of the organization shall begin on the first day of September and end on the last day of August in each year.

Article X

Dues

The membership may prescribe membership dues in such amount and classifications as it deems appropriate and necessary. This action shall be considered a "matter requiring special voting procedure" as defined in Section 4, Article 4.

Article XI

Seal

The membership shall provide a corporate seal if and when the organization becomes incorporated which shall be in the form of a circle and shall inscribe therein the name of the corporation and the words "Corporate Seal Commonwealth of Pennsylvania."

Article XII

Amendments to the Bylaws

These bylaws may be altered, amended, or repealed and new bylaws may be adopted by a vote of 2/3 of the members present at a meeting. At least ten days prior to the meeting a written notice of the proposed changes will be given to all members.

DLS/er
12/19/72